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THE BELLONI DECISION AND ITS LEGACY: UNITED
STATES V. OREGON AND ITS FAR-REACHING
EFFECTS AFTER A HALF-CENTURY
BY
MICHAEL C. BLUMM* & CARI BAERMANN**
Fifty years ago, Judge Robert Belloni handed down a historic
treaty fishing rights case in Sohappy v. Smith, later consolidated
into United States v. Oregon, which remains among the longest
running federal district court cases in history. Judge Belloni ruled
that the state violated Columbia River tribes’ treaty rights by failing
to ensure “a fair share” to tribal harvesters and called upon the state
to give separate consideration to the tribal fishery and make it a
management priority co-equal with its goals for non-treaty
commercial and recreational fisheries. This result was premised on
Belloni’s recognition of the inherent biases in state regulation,
despite a lack of facial discrimination.
The decision was remarkable because only a year before, in
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, the U.S. Supreme Court
seemed to accord considerable deference to state regulation of tribal
harvests (which it would soon clarify and circumscribe). Instead of
deference, the Belloni decision reinstated burdens on state
regulation that the Supreme Court had imposed a quarter-century
earlier, in Tulee v. Washington, but seemed to ignore in its Puyallup
decision. The directive for separate management was prescient
because otherwise, tribal harvests would remain overwhelmed by
more numerous and politically powerful commercial and
recreational fishers.
Judge Belloni eventually grew tired of resolving numerous
conflicts over state regulation of the tribal fishery, calling for the
establishment of a comprehensive plan, agreed to by both the state
and the tribes, to manage Columbia Basin fish harvests. Eventually,
such a plan would be negotiated, implemented, and amended over
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the years. Today, the Columbia River Comprehensive Management
Plan is still in effect a half-century after the Belloni decision,
although the district court’s oversight role is now somewhat
precariously perched due to statements by Belloni’s latest successor.
Nonetheless, the plan remains the longest standing example of
tribal–state co-management in history and a model for other comanagement efforts. The Belloni decision was the first judicial
recognition of the importance of the tribal sovereignty in regulating
reserved rights resources. This Article examines the origins, effects,
and legacy of the Belloni decision over the last half-century.
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V.
VI.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1969 was a momentous year in many respects, from the moon
landing to the Miracle Mets.1 In the Northwest, the most significant
event of 1969 in terms of long-term effect was Judge Robert Belloni’s
historic decision rejecting the state of Oregon’s claim to regulate tribal

1 In 1969, man first walked on the moon. Richard Nixon was inaugurated as President. The Vietnam War induced massive antiwar demonstrations. The massacre of Vietnamese civilians by American troops at My Lai went public. The Chicago Eight stood trial
for allegedly conspiring to induce the rioting that marred the Democratic Convention the
year before. Charles Manson shocked the public with the wanton murder of five, including
actress Sharon Tate. The raid of the Stonewall Inn in Greenwich Village christened the
modern gay rights movement. The Cuyahoga River caught fire in Cleveland, propelling
what would become an onslaught of environmental legislation over the next decade. The
Beatles broke up. Woodstock and the Miracle Mets happened. See generally 1969: Woodstock, the Moon and Manson: The Turbulent End to the ‘60s, TIME MAG., SPECIAL EDITION
(n.d.).
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fishing on the Columbia River without acknowledging or protecting
treaty fishing rights.2 A half-century later, the case continues to allocate
harvest rights on the Columbia River, historically the salmon
stronghold of the Pacific Northwest.3 This Article explains the
conditions that brought about Judge Belloni’s historic decision, explores
his reasoning, and examines the case’s legacy after fifty years.
Columbia Basin tribes had been salmon harvesters for millennia
before the Belloni decision.4 In fact, it would be difficult to overstate the
importance of salmon runs to native life. Natives held “first salmon”
ceremonies, which included prayers thanking the creator for annual
return.5 The fish were vital to the native diet, culture, and economy, as
salmon were always a major item of trade. Trade in salmon was brisk; it
made the natives of the Pacific Northwest North America’s wealthiest
aboriginals north of Mexico.6 Salmon were no less central to the way of
life of “the salmon people” of the Northwest than the buffalo was to the
natives of the plains or the reindeer to the Inuit of the Arctic.7
2

Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 907 (D. Or. 1969).
Under its retained jurisdiction of the case, the court has been and continues to be
instrumental in ensuring that the tribes receive a fair share of the fish harvest on the Columbia River each year. See infra Part IV. Although thirteen species of Columbia Basin
salmon are currently on the endangered species list, with production at more than 10 million fish below historical levels, the Columbia River salmon runs remain a significant
source of fish for both nontreaty and treaty fishermen. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT LITIGATION REGARDING COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON AND
STEELHEAD 2 (2016); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVIEW 2 (2018).
4 Tribes have depended on the abundance of salmon in the Columbia River for over
9,000 years. Prior to white settlement, numerous tribes established temporary and permanent fishing camps along the Columbia River, including major fishing areas such as
Celilo Falls, now drowned behind The Dalles Dam. Their travel between these traditional
fishing sites and other tribal homes revolved around the seasonal fish runs, with thousands of families gathering during the spring to harvest, trade, and celebrate the salmon.
See Michael C. Blumm & James Brunberg, “Not Much Less Necessary . . . Than the Atmosphere They Breathed”: Salmon, Indian Treaties, and the Supreme Court—A Centennial
Remembrance of United States v. Winans and Its Enduring Significance, 46 NAT. RES. J.
5, 6, 7, 55 (2006).
Judge Robert Belloni, a newly appointed judge in 1967, had no previous background
in Indian Law, so he had no predetermined views on treaty fishing rights. The chief judge,
Gus J. Solomon, assigned the case to Belloni simply as part of the administration of the
court. Interview by Laura Berg with Judge Robert Belloni, D. Or. (Dec. 18, 1989) [hereinafter “Berg, Interview with Belloni”]; see also Laura Berg, Let Them Do as They Have
Promised, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVT’L L. & POL’Y 311, 317 (2008).
5 Charles F. Wilkinson & Daniel Keith Conner, The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery: Conservation and Allocation of a Transboundary Common Property Resource, 32 U.
KAN. L. REV. 17, 26 n.40 (1983).
6 See MICHAEL C. BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY OF
THE DECLINE OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON 3 (2002) [hereinafter SACRIFICING THE
SALMON].
7 Id. at 53.
3

Salmon dominated life the Pacific Northwest before white settlement. Trade in
salmon enabled Northwest Indians tribes to become one of the world’s few hunting
and gathering economies that generated wealth beyond . . . subsistence. Salmon
gave these tribes the economic prosperity to support a population density higher
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Thus, it was no surprise that when white settlement threatened
displacement of the natives, they were willing to enter into treaties in
which the tribes ceded some 64 million acres of land to the federal
government that enabled white settlement largely without wars.8 The
treaties left the tribes some relatively small land reservations, schools,
missionaries, and federal recognition of their right to continue to take
fish “at all other usual and accustomed [fishing locations] in common
with” the settlers.9 This promise that tribal harvesters could continue to
fish at their historic locations, as they had since “time immemorial,” was
central to the treaty bargain.10
Unpacking what the treaty right meant to both the settlers’
property rights and the states’ regulatory authority would take over a
century of litigation, including seven U.S. Supreme Court opinions.11
Judge Belloni’s 1969 decision came only a year after a confused
Supreme Court in Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game12 (Puyallup
I)—in its fourth Stevens Treaty decision—seemed to sanction a large
role for state regulation of treaty rights.13 Judge Belloni would be much
more skeptical of state regulation than the Puyallup Court, and that
Court would soon clarify that state regulation could not discriminate

than anywhere north of Mexico. Salmon were abundant, available for harvest at
predictable times, and could be preserved for later consumption. Salmon were the
centerpiece of the natives’ diet, their lifestyle, and their religion. Seasonal migrations of natives coincided with annual fish runs. Most tribes celebrated a First
Salmon Ceremony which . . . involved a religious right thanking the deity for the
salmon’s return . . . . These symbolic acts, attitudes of respect, and concern for the
well-being of the salmon reflected the interdependence and interrelatedness of all
living things that dominated the native world view. This attitude ensured that
salmon were never wantonly waster, and water pollution was generally prohibited.
Id.
8 See id. at 62–63 (explaining a brief “war” in the late 1850s, caused by a broken federal promise that the tribes would have two years to relocate to reservations before settlers claimed their ceded lands). Most natives were willing to negotiate treaties rather
than fight wars because their numbers had declined—due largely to white-induced diseases like smallpox for which the natives had no immunity—drastically since their encounter
with the Lewis and Clark expedition, from an estimated 50,000 to just 5,000 in just a halfcentury. Id. at 56.
9 E.g., Treaty with the Walla-Walla, Cayuses, and Umatilla Tribes and Bands, art. 1,
June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 945 (an example of what are known as Stevens Treaties, after the
U.S. negotiator of the treaties); for elaboration, see Michael C. Blumm & Olivier Jamin,
Indigenous Rights in the U.S. Marine Environment: The Stevens Treaties and Their Effects
on Harvests and Habitat, in INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT (Stephen
Allen, et al., eds., 2019).
10 United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983) (upholding a tribe’s
“time immemorial” fishing rights); SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 6, at 60–63 (discussing what was the Supreme Court’s first interpretation of Stevens Treaty language).
11 See, e.g., FAY COHEN, TREATIES ON TRIAL: THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY OVER
NORTHWEST INDIAN FISHING RIGHTS 55, 75, 198–99 (1986).
12 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
13 See Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. 899, 911–12 (D. Or. 1969); Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398,
discussed infra notes 85–112 and accompanying text.
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against tribal harvesters.14 The Belloni decision would prove to be the
turning point in judicial interpretation of treaty fishing rights, leading
to two important Supreme Court decisions.15
Rejecting the state’s claim that its sovereignty equipped it with
plenary authority to regulate tribal harvesting rights, Judge Belloni
interpreted the Stevens Treaties to require the state to produce a
substantive result: a tribal “fair share” of the salmon harvests.16 His
prescription for doing so was to require the state to begin to treat the
tribal fishery separate from the non-treaty fishery.17 That was a
prerequisite to a fair allocation of harvest opportunities because the
Columbia Basin tribes’ upriver fishing sites put them at a locational
disadvantage compared to non-Indian ocean and lower river fishers.18
As Judge Belloni understood, close judicial review was essential to
prod the state to act in a fair and non-discriminatory fashion, given the
state’s close ties to its commercial and recreational fishers.19 Eventually,
14 Dep’t of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 U.S. 44, 48 (1973) (clarifying that
state regulation could not lawfully discriminate against tribal harvesters in applying a
facially nondiscriminatory regulation).
15 The first was Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 685–87, modified sub nom. Washington v. United States, 444 U.S.
816, 816–17 (1979) (affirming Judge Boldt’s 50% allocation of fish run harvests), discussed
infra note 181. The second was Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018) (affirming, without opinion, a Ninth Circuit decision that held that the state of Washington
had violated the Stevens Indian Treaties by building and maintaining culverts that prevented salmon from reaching tribal usual and accustomed fishing grounds), discussed infra note 263. Two 2019 decisions of the Supreme Court reaffirmed the off-reservation
rights contained in the Stevens Treaties. Wash. State Dept. of Licensing v. Cougar Den
Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019) (concerning off-reservation rights on public highways), discussed infra notes 149, 246, 266 and accompanying text; Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct.
1686 (2019) (concerning off-reservation hunting rights similar to those reserved in the
Stevens Treaties), discussed infra note 78.
16 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 911.
17 Id.
18 The non-treaty fisheries were and are primarily downriver of the Bonneville Dam,
including extensive ocean fisheries. Treaty fishermen had exclusive fisheries between the
Bonneville and McNary Dams. The state implemented most of its conservation regulations
upriver of the Bonneville Dam, thereby forcing the treaty fishermen to bear the brunt of
the conservation. Penny H. Harrison, The Evolution of a New Comprehensive Plan for
Managing Columbia River Anadromous Fish, 16 ENVTL. L. 705, 712–13 (1986); see also
infra notes 192–193 (discussing the conservation burden imposed on tribes).
19 State regulation was problematic for the tribes because the states were “captured”
by the commercial and recreational fishermen they regulated. The classic study of agency
capture by rent-seeking, well-organized interest groups is MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 143 (1965); see also Jeffrey K. Randall, Improving Compliance in U.S. Federal Fisheries: An Enforcement Agency
Perspective, 35 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 287, 303 n.22 (2004) (discussing compliance issues
with the U.S. federal fisheries management process and explaining that “‘[a]gency capture’
occurs when the regulated industry is successful at aligning the regulatory agency’s goals
with its own, leading to lax application of the regulations and willingness to overlook certain violations by inspectors.”). Belloni recognized agency capture in Sohappy, noting that
the state’s regulation of fisheries favored non-treaty commercial and sports fishermen to
the detriment of treaty fishing rights. Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 908–09 (explaining that
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Belloni would call for a comprehensive plan to ensure a fair allocation.20
That call would not be consistently met over the ensuing years,21 but in
recent years the tribes and states have successfully negotiated two
consecutive ten-year plans, which have governed harvest management
since 2008.22 Judge Belloni’s successors have continued to oversee the
development and implementation of revised plans that reflected
changed conditions over time, and there is a judicially approved plan in
effect today.23
This Article considers the significance and legacy of the Belloni
decision a half-century later. Part II provides background, briefly
explaining Stevens Treaty fishing rights litigation prior to the Belloni
decision, including the Supreme Court’s first Puyallup opinion, for its
flawed reasoning could have cast a long shadow over the case before
Judge Belloni. But as Part III—exploring the reasoning of the Belloni
decision—shows, the judge was unfazed by some implications that
might have been drawn from Puyallup. He instead ruled that the state
of Oregon’s position was inconsistent with the tribes’ treaty rights by
failing to ensure “a fair share” harvest of the resource.24 To achieve this
result, Belloni established a number of innovative procedural
requirements, like “meaningful” tribal participation in managing the
fishery and requiring that state regulation minimally intrude on tribal
harvests.25 Part IV examines the legacy of the decision throughout the
Pacific Northwest, while Part V looks more broadly at the national
legacy of the case beyond the region. We conclude that the Belloni
decision, after a half-century, is an underappreciated landmark both in
terms of achieving a fair allocation of a highly contested and valuable
natural resource and in faithfully interpreting Indian treaties according
to the intent of the parties that negotiated them.
II. TREATY INTERPRETATION PRIOR TO THE BELLONI DECISION
This Part explains some of the important early interpretations of
the treaty right “of taking fish . . . in common with” others.26 It then
turns to focus on the Supreme Court’s important decision in its 1942

regulation of the Oregon’s Fish Commission and Game Commission, “as well as their extensive propagation efforts, [was] designed not just to preserve the fish but to perpetuate
and enhance the supply for their respective user interests”); see also Berg, Interview with
Belloni, supra note 4 (discussing the persistent unfairness of state regulation).
20 See infra notes 197–202 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 203–221 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 222–228 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 224, 231 and accompanying text. Judge Belloni’s successors included
Judges James Burns, Walter Craig, Edward Leavy, Macolm Marsh, Garr King, and Michael Mosman.
24 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 911.
25 Id. at 912.
26 Id. at 904.
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decision Tulee v. Washington,27 which seemed to impose a significant
burden on state regulation of state so-called conservation measures.
A. The Early Decisions
The Stevens Treaties of the 1850s, which cleared title to some 64million acres of formerly tribal land and enabled the peaceful settlement
of the Northwest, promised the tribes the right to continue fish on the
lands they ceded at all “usual and accustomed” fishing sites “in common
with” the settlers.28 Although the original idea was that native fishing
would supply food for the settlers, within a few decades the expanding
white population began to compete for salmon harvests.29 Technological
developments, like gasoline-powered fishing boats, fish wheels, and
barbed-wire fences enabled the white settlers to exclude tribal harvests
over the objections of Indian agents.30 Fences led to the first major
appellate decision interpreting the Stevens Treaties.31
At Celilo Falls, the great Indian fishery on the lower Columbia,
O.D. Taylor—a Baptist minister—bought riverside land adjoining the
falls in what became the state of Washington and strung barbed wire to
exclude tribal fishers, so he could rent access to the falls to white
harvesters.32 An Indian agent and several tribal harvesters
unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the fencing in territorial district court,
but the territorial supreme court reversed in a mostly forgotten 1887
decision of United States v. Taylor.33 Taylor was the first appellate court
decision to articulate a rule of Stevens Treaty construction that the
Supreme Court would soon endorse: the treaties should be interpreted
27

315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942).
See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 6, at 53–67 (discussing the treaty negotiations and the aftermath of the treaties).
29 See id. at 63–65.
30 See Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 4, at 506–10 (discussing, inter alia, the role of
Indian agent, Robert H. Milroy); see also id. at 517–18. On fish wheels, see infra note 39.
31 See Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 4, at 511–14 (discussing an earlier case involving tribal exclusion, Spedis v. Simpson (Klickitat Cty. Ct., July 22, 1884) (on file in
Klickitat County, Wash. Archives, File KLK-126), but that case did not generate appellate
review).
32 See id. at 512. For thousands of years, Celilo Falls was the most prominent fishing
site for tribes. Celilo was a series of formidable, fast rapids that forced the salmon to cluster the waters downriver of the falls. This funneling allowed the tribal fishermen to harvest vast amounts of fish. Six tribes maintained permanent villages near the falls, and,
during the spring, thousands of natives gathered there, harvesting fish and engaging in
extensive trading. Id. at 494–96. In the early twentieth century, in a landmark Supreme
Court decision concerning treaty fishing harvesting rights at Celilo Falls, the Court recognized the critical importance of the salmon to the tribes, describing the fish as “not much
less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.” United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). However, in 1957, the federal government’s
Dalles Dam flooded the falls and wiped out nearby tribal villages. See Celilo Falls,
COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM’N, https://perma.cc/G38U-YBCB (last visited
Apr. 18, 2020).
33 3 Wash. Terr. 88, 94, 98 (1887).
28
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as the unlettered Indians would have understood.34 Taylor also
advanced an early version of what became known as the reserved rights
doctrine—that treaties should be understood as conveyances of rights
granted from the tribes to the federal government, while reserving to
the tribes all rights not expressly conveyed.35 This recognition of
reserved rights led the court to conclude that Taylor’s land title was
burdened with implied rights of access for tribal fishers to reach their
fishing grounds.36 He therefore had no right to fence out the tribal
fishers.37
The Taylor decision did not settle the issue of tribal access to their
fishing places, as exclusions continued to be widespread throughout the
Columbia Basin, largely due to a narrow interpretation by lower courts
and lax vigilance by federal agents.38 For example, settlers on the
Washington side of Celilo Falls, the Winans brothers, erected a large
fish wheel and then fenced out tribal harvesters seeking access to their
historic fishing grounds.39 Although the federal district court
temporarily enjoined the fencing for nearly seven years, in 1903 Judge
Cornelius Hanford suddenly dissolved the injunction, deciding that the
treaty put the tribes only “on an equal footing” with white settlers,
whom the Winans brothers could exclude based on their land ownership
rights.40 The federal government appealed the dissolution of the
injunction directly to the Supreme Court.41
In an opinion by Justice Joseph McKenna, the Court decided, 8–1,
that the “equal footing” argument that the lower court adopted was “an
impotent outcome to negotiations and a convention, which seemed to
promise more and give the word of the Nation for more.”42 Ratifying the
rule of interpretation that Indian treaties be construed as the tribes
would understand, Justice McKenna described the nature of the treaty
fishing right in eloquent, almost poetic terms: “The right to resort to the
34 Id. at 96–98; see Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 4, at 519. On the Supreme Court’s
adoption of the rule of liberal interpretation in light of likely tribal understanding, see infra note 43 and accompanying text.
35 Taylor, 3 Wash. Terr. at 96–97 (“the Indians in making the treaty . . . more likely . . .
grant[ed] only such rights as they were to part with, rather than . . . conveyed all . . . .”).
36 Id. at 97–98.
37 Id. at 98.
38 See Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 4, at 521–22.
39 See id. at 523–24. A fish wheel was a kind of dipnet powered by the river that had
huge baskets continually scooping salmon out the river. Fishermen used weirs, or wooden
fences, to funnel the fish into the wheel. Columbia River Fish Wheel, OR. HISTORY
PROJECT, https://perma.cc/2P88-KTTX (last visited Apr. 18, 2020). Fish wheels, first introduced on the Columbia by non-Indians in 1879, enabled harvesters like the Winans brothers to catch fish by the ton with little effort. Their fences threatened monopolization of
traditional native fishing sites because the fish wheels could harvest massive amounts of
fish, completely destroying a fish run. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 679, modified sub nom. Washington v. United States,
444 U.S. 816–17 (1979).
40 See Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 4, at 528–29.
41 See id. at 529.
42 Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905).
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fishing places in controversy was a part of larger rights possessed by the
Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a shadow of
impediment, and which was not much less necessary to the existence of
Indians than the atmosphere that they breathed.”43 The Court saw the
treaty right as creating in the tribes vested property rights to access
their historic fishing sites, describing the “right of taking fish” as
establishing a “right in land . . . a servitude upon every piece of land as
though described therein.”44 This servitude, a property right, ran
against both the federal government and its grantees like the Winans
brothers.45 Thus, the brothers could not fence out the tribes from fishing
at Celilo Falls.46 However, the Court sowed the seeds of confusion by
stating that the treaty right did not “restrain the state reasonably, if at
all, in the regulation of the right.”47
A decade and a half after United States v. Winans, the Court
revisited the Stevens Treaty fishing rights in a case involving similar
rights of tribal fishers to access Celilo Falls, this time from the Oregon
side of the falls.48 Oregon landowners attempted to distinguish the
Winans situation by asserting that the fishing rights of the Yakama
tribe did not extend to the Oregon side of the Columbia River because
the tribe’s treaty ceded lands only to the middle of the Columbia River.49
The Court would not have any of it, invoking the rule of construction
requiring courts to interpret treaties as the Indians would understand,
and noting that they fished on both sides of the falls both before and
after the treaty.50
Some two decades later, the Supreme Court again took up the
Stevens Treaties in a case involving the issue of whether the state of

43 Id. at 381. In discussing the rules of interpreting Indian treaties, McKenna explained, “[w]e have said that we will construe a treaty with the Indians as “that unlettered
people” understood it, and “as justice and reason demand in all cases where power is exerted by the strong over those to whom they owe care and protection,” and counterpoised
the inequality “by the superior justice which looks only to the substance of the right without regard to technical rules.” See id. at 380–81.
44 Id. at 381–82.
45 Id.
46 The Court also rejected the Winans’ argument that the tribes’ treaty rights were affected by the state of Washington’s admission to the Union in 1889 on “an equal footing
with the original states.” Id. at 382–83. Citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894), the
Court upheld federal authority to recognize treaty rights on federal territory prestatehood. Id.; see also id. at 384 (“And surely it was within the competency of the Nation
to secure to the Indians such a remnant of the great rights they possessed as ‘taking fish
at all usual and accustomed places.’”).
47 Id.
48 Seufert Bros. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 195–96 (1919).
49 Id. at 198.
50 Id. at 197–99 (also noting that the Seufert brothers had ample notice of the existence of the treaty fishing right from the “habitual and customary use of the premises,
which must have been so open and notorious . . . that any person, not negligently or willfully blind to the conditions of the property he was purchasing, must have known of
them.”).

356

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 50:347

Washington could charge a license fee to tribal fishers.51 A state court
convicted Sampson Tulee, a Yakama tribal member, of violating state
law by selling salmon without a state dipnet license.52 Tulee filed
petition for writ of habeas corpus in district court, but a state court
denied the petition on the grounds that he was subject to state
regulation, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed his
conviction.53 However, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion
by Justice Hugo Black, reversed, invoking the rules of treaty
interpretation and concluding that the tribes would not have understood
their treaty rights to be subject to state revenue measures like license
fees.54 Consequently, the Court rejected the state’s defense that the fee
was necessary for conservation, a claim which was no doubt undercut by
the state’s exempting non-Indian recreational hook-and-line fishers
from license fees.55
Justice Black stated that in order to successfully invoke the
“conservation necessity” defense, the state had to show that the fees
were “indispensable” for conservation.56 By refusing to accept a facially
nondiscriminatory state regulation that imposed financial barriers on
the exercise of the treaty fishing right, the Court seemed to impose a
significant proof burden on state conservation measures. That burden
would not be one that survived ensuing case law.
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of Tulee v. Washington’s
Conservation Necessity Standard
In 1949, the Makah tribe filed suit against the state of Washington,
seeking an injunction against the state’s fishing regulations that
restricted its members fishing to “one pole and line with two single
hooks or one artificial bait per person” at certain traditional river
fishing grounds.57 Since salmon do not feed after entering the fresh
water rivers, this restriction effectively prohibited tribal members from
employing their traditional harvesting practices. The Makah’s treaty
with the United States, the Treaty of Neah Bay, included an express
provision securing “[t]he right of taking fish and of whaling or sealing at
usual and accustomed grounds and stations” to the Makah “in common
with all citizens of the United States.”58
51

Tulee, 315 U.S. 681, 682 (1942).
Id.
53 State v. Tulee, 7 Wash. 2d 124, 125 (1941), rev’d sub nom. Tulee v. Washington, 315
U.S. 681 (1942).
54 Tulee, 315 U.S. at 684–85.
55 Id. at 682 n.1, 685.
56 Id. at 685.
57 Makah Indian Tribe v. Schoettler, 192 F.2d 224, 225 (9th Cir. 1951).
58 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Makah Tribe of Indians, U.S.Makah Tribe, art. IV, Jan. 31, 1859, 12 Stat. 939; see also Makah, 192 F.2d at 225. The
Makah’s treaty is the only one of the Stevens Treaties including a right to whale. Blumm
& Jamin, supra note 9, at 300–01.
52
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The federal district court dismissed the tribe’s complaint, and the
tribe appealed.59 The state defended its regulations, claiming they were
consistent with the treaty language “in common with” because the state
had the authority to prohibit non-Indian fishing, so it claimed the same
authority to prohibit Indian fishing.60 The Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument in Makah Indian Tribe v. Schoetter, relying on the principle
established in Tulee that the treaty reserved to the tribe an exemption
from state interference that non-Indians do not share.61 The court also
emphasized Tulee’s conservation necessity doctrine, ruling that because
the state had not proved its regulation was necessary for the
conservation of the fish, it could not impair the Makah’s treaty fishing
rights guaranteed by the treaty.62 The appeals court dismissed the
state’s justification for rejecting alternative conservation regulations on
cost grounds as well, deciding that the state could not restrict exercise of
the treaty fishing right simply “because of the cost of preventing their
taking of fish in excess of that right.”63 The court consequently ordered
the district court to enjoin the state from enforcing its regulations
against the tribe.64
A dozen years after the Makah decision, a dispute over the offreservation fishing rights of the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
reservation—which also had a Stevens Treaty right of “taking fish” offreservation “in common with citizens of the United States”65—resulted
in another Ninth Circuit decision.66 In 1958, the state of Oregon
arrested three tribal fishermen for violating its regulation closing
fishing during certain parts of the year on tributaries of the Columbia
and Snake Rivers.67 The tribes responded by suing, seeking both
declaratory and injunctive relief against state enforcement of its
regulations.68
This time the district court ruled in favor of the tribes, holding that
they had an unimpeded treaty right to fish at all usual and accustomed
fishing grounds, which was not subject to state game laws or
regulations.69 The Ninth Circuit affirmed in Maison v. Confederated
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation,70 relying on the reserved
rights doctrine first laid down in Winans, that the “treaty was not a

59

Makah, 192 F.2d at 225.
Id. at 225–26.
61 Id. at 226 (citing Tulee, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942)).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 225.
64 Id. at 226
65 Maison v. Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation, 314 F.2d 169, 170
(9th Cir. 1963), disapproved of by Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392, n.14 at 401–02 (1968).
66 Maison, 314 F.2d at 169.
67 Id. at 170–71.
68 Id. at 171.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 174.
60
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grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them—a
reservation of those not granted.”71
As in Makah, the Maison court concluded that the state had failed
to meet the conservation necessity test established by Tulee.72 The state
was not only unable to show that there was a need to limit the taking of
fish, it could not prove its regulation limiting treaty fishing rights was
“indispensable” to conserving fish for the preservation of the species.73
Consequently, the court decided that the state’s aim was actually to
conserve fish for use by non-Indian commercial and sports fishermen,
with no regard for the needs of treaty fishermen.74 The court ruled that
any state restriction of treaty fishing rights on conservation grounds
was unjustified if conservation goals could be met through regulation of
other user groups, a ruling that Judge Belloni would enforce.75 In
contrast, the treaties did not reserve rights for non-Indians; therefore,
the court held that the state could exclude sports fishermen from the
fishing grounds in question, but not tribal harvesters.76
Three years after Maison, the same tribes challenged Oregon’s
attempt to regulate off-reservation subsistence hunting rights. In
Holcomb v. Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation,77 the
tribes sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Oregon State
Police Department’s enforcing state hunting regulations against tribal
members hunting deer on ceded open and “unclaimed land.”78 The lower
71

Id. at 171 (quoting Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905)).
Id. at 172–73 (citing Tulee, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942)).
73 Id. at 173.
74 Id. at 172–73; see also Ralph W. Johnson, The States Versus Indian Off-Reservation
Fishing: A United States Supreme Court Error, 47 WASH. L. REV. 207, 223 (1972) (explaining that the state in Maison failed to meet “the burden of proving that the regulations in
question were necessary for conservation”).
75 Maison, 314 F.2d at 172–73; see infra notes 147–175 and accompanying text (discussing the Belloni decision).
76 Maison, 314 F.2d at 174. The Ninth Circuit did recognize that the tribes’ treaty
rights were “in common” rights, meaning that the tribes could not harvest to the exclusion
of non-Indian fishers, although the state could exclude non-Indians from tribal “usual and
accustomed” fishing grounds. Id. at 171–72.
77 382 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1967).
78 Id. at 1013–14; see State v. Miller, 689 P.2d 81, 85 (1984) (describing the tribes’ case
against Oregon). The tribes’ treaty, like the other Stevens Treaties, recognized Indian
rights to hunt on open and “unclaimed lands.” Treaty with the Walla-Walla, Cayuses, and
Umatilla Tribes and Bands, art. 1, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 945. In 2019, the Supreme Court
interpreted similar language in the Crow Treaty (“the right to hunt on the unoccupied
lands of the United States so long as game may be found thereon” and “peace subsists . . .
on the borders of the hunting districts”) to survive Wyoming statehood and the establishment of Big Horn National Forest because there was no evidence that Congress intended
the right to be implicitly terminated or that the tribe understood that to be the case, applying the canons of treaty interpretation. Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1691
(2019). However, Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s opinion for a 5-member majority did suggest
that, while the formation of the Big Horn National Forest did not categorically occupy for
purposes of the treaty, the state could argue that the place where the hunting took place
was occupied, and it could also regulate if the standards for conservation necessity. Id. at
1691, 1703.
72
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court agreed with the tribes that their treaty reserved their right to
hunt on all unclaimed land they ceded without state regulation, absent
a showing of conservation necessity.79 The lower court consequently
enjoined state regulations that prohibited Indian off-reservation
hunting.80
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court, rejecting the state’s
argument that Oregon’s admission into the Union on an equal footing
with other states diminished the tribes’ treaty rights.81 The court
reaffirmed its ruling in Maison that the state may restrict treaty
hunting and fishing rights only if that restriction is indispensable to
conservation.82 The district court found that the deer population was
healthy enough to support both sportsmen hunting and Indian hunting,
and that the state possessed alternative methods of conservation.83 The
Ninth Circuit therefore held that the regulation was thus not necessary
to conservation needs, and consequently the state could not restrict the
Confederated Tribes’ hunting rights.84
C. The Effect of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Puyallup Tribe v.
Department of Game
At the same time that Holcomb was pending in federal court,
Puyallup I was making its way through state courts to the United States
Supreme Court.85 The suit began in Washington state courts as two
separate suits.86 In both cases, the state of Washington sought
declaratory relief and an injunction against Puyallup and Nisqually
tribal harvesters to stop them from net fishing in the Puyallup and
Nisqually Rivers.87 Representatives of both tribes had signed the Treaty
of Medicine Creek, a Stevens Treaty which recognized the tribes’ “right
79

Holcomb, 382 F.2d at 1014–15.
Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Maison, 262 F. Supp. 871,
873 (D. Or. 1966), aff’d sub nom. Holcomb, 382 F.2d at 1013. The Supreme Court’s recent
Herrera decision, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019) (discussed supra note 78), would justify the result
in Holcomb.
81 Holcomb, 382 F.2d at 1014. That result was ordained by Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 382–
83 (1905) (rejecting the argument that the equal footing doctrine gave the state of Washington the right to regulate lands below the high-water mark of navigable waters).
82 Holcomb, 382 F.2d at 1014.
83 Confederated Tribes of Umatilla, 262 F. Supp. at 873. Each year, the state issued
around 30,000 elk tags and 45,000–50,000 deer licenses to sportsmen. In contrast, treaty
hunters killed only 150–175 elk and 300–350 deer annually. The lower court stated that if
the state wanted to conserve the deer and elk population, it should issue fewer licenses to
sportsmen before limiting Indians exercising their hunting rights. Id. at 872–73.
84 Holcomb, 382 F.2d at 1015.
85 391 U.S. 392, 394 (1968).
86 Dep’t of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. (Puyallup Tribe), 422 P.2d 754, 754 (Wash.
1967), aff’d sub nom. Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392 (1968); Dep’t of Game v. Kautz, 422 P.2d
771, 772 (Wash. 1967), aff’d sub nom. Puyallup Tribe I, 391 U.S. 392 (1968). These cases
were combined in petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court in Puyallup I,
391 U.S. at 394.
87 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 394–96.
80
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of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . . in
common with all citizens of the Territory.”88 The state claimed that the
tribes’ treaty rights contained no exemption from state regulations, and
a Washington superior court agreed.89
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that tribes’
off-reservation fishing rights were subject to state regulation if those
regulations were reasonable and necessary for preservation of the fish.90
The state court announced its disagreement with the indispensability
test established in Tulee, relying instead on the “reasonable and
necessary” test the lower court invoked.91
The tribes appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, where their appeal
was hampered by the position of the federal government. As one
commentator noted, despite the federal trust responsibility to the
Indians, the Department of Justice submitted an amicus brief that
rejected the tribes’ argument that their treaty fishing rights were not
subject to state regulation.92 Instead of advocating for tribal treaty
rights under its duty as trustee for the Indians, the federal government
compromised one of the Indians’ treaty rights—the right to fish at usual
and accustomed fishing grounds, subject only to “indispensable” state
conservation regulation, as apparently recognized in Tulee.93 The brief
advocated use of the Schoettler–Maison rule that states may regulate
off-reservation treaty fishing when “necessary” for conservation.94
The federal brief laid an unfortunate foundation that led the
Supreme Court to affirm the Washington Supreme Court’s decision.95 A
unanimous Court did recognize that the tribes’ treaties reserved the
tribes’ right to fish off-reservation at “all usual and accustomed”
places.96 However, Justice Douglas’s opinion proceeded to narrowly
interpret the reserved fishing right, finding it significant that the treaty
did not explicitly reserve the right to fish “in the ‘usual and accustomed’

88 Puyallup Tribe, 422 P.2d at 755–56 (quoting Treaty of Medicine Creek, art. 3, Dec.
26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132); see also Kautz, 422 P.2d at 772.
89 Puyallup Tribe, 422 P.2d at 755–56; Kautz, 422 P.2d at 772–73; Puyallup I, 391 U.S.
at 394.
90 Puyallup Tribe, 422 P.2d at 764; Kautz, 422 P.2d at 774.
91 Puyallup Tribe, 422 P.2d at 761–64; Kautz, 422 P.2d at 774 (citing State v. McCoy,
387 P.2d 942, 953 (Wash. 1963)) (“The treaty secured to the Indians an interest in land,
consisting of an easement, which secured to them the right not to be excluded from their
usual and accustomed fishing grounds by non-Indians. Those cases which recognize this
right and protect the Indian from such exclusion do not hold that a state may not subject
the Indians to reasonable and necessary regulations in the exercise of these rights, for the
protection of the fishery resource.”).
92 Johnson, supra note 74, at 225; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4–5,
Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392 (1967) (No. 76-1631), 1976 WL 181286.
93 Tulee, 315 U.S. 681, 684–85 (1942); see supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s indispensability test).
94 Brief for the United States, supra note 92, at 3–5.
95 See Johnson, supra note 74, at 226.
96 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398–99 (citing Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905)).
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manner,” nor did it specify the purpose for which the Indians fished.97
This circumscribed reading seemed contrary to the rules of treaty
interpretation under which treaties are liberally construed in favor of
the Indians, with ambiguities interpreted as the tribes themselves
would have understood them.98
Justice Douglas focused instead on the treaty language stating that
the tribes had the right to fish “in common with all citizens of the
Territory.”99 This language, combined with the fact that the treaties
were silent as to manner and purpose of fishing, induced the Court to
suggest there was no reason why the state could not regulate the tribes,
just as it regulated non-Indian harvests.100 But in a prescient
commentary on the decision, Professor Ralph Johnson claimed that “[n]o
valid basis for the existence of such state power can be found.”101 As
Johnson noted, because Indian treaties are the “supreme law of the
land,” they can be abrogated only by Congress.102 Moreover, the
Supreme Court long before had stated that “the intention to abrogate or
modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress.”103 Johnson
argued that under these established rules of interpretation, unless
Congress or the treaties expressly provided for state regulation, the
tribes’ exercise of treaty rights is not subject to state regulation.104
Ignoring rules of treaty interpretation, the Puyallup I Court
declared that while the tribes’ fishing right could
not be qualified by the State, . . . the manner of fishing, the size of the take,
the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like may be regulated by the

97

Id. at 398.
See Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912) (construction of Indian treaties should
be liberal, with doubtful expressions to be resolved in favor of the Indians); Montana v.
Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985); Alaska Pac. Fisheries Co. v. United
States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918); see also Tulee, 315 U.S. at 684–85 (“In determining the
scope of the reserved rights of hunting and fishing, we must not give the treaty the narrowest construction it will bear. . . . It is our responsibility to see that the terms of the
treaty are carried out, so far as possible, in accordance with the meaning they were understood to have by the tribal representatives at the council and in a spirit which generously
recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of a dependent people.”).
99 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 395.
100 Id. at 398.
101 Johnson, supra note 74, at 208.
102 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); see Johnson, supra note 74, at 208.
103 Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (quoting Pigeon River Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934)).
104 Johnson, supra note 74, at 208; see also David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural
Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1573, 1620 (1996) (stating that “tribal sovereignty may only be abrogated only with a clear
statement of congressional intent”).
98
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State in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets
appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the Indians.105

This led Justice Douglas to narrowly construe Tulee to merely forbid the
state from charging license fees, while emphasizing that the state could
regulate the “time and manner of fishing . . . necessary for the
conservation of fish.”106 The Puyallup I decision made no mention of the
burden Tulee imposed on the state to prove that its regulation be
“indispensable to the effectiveness of a state conservation program.”107
Instead, it deferred to the Washington Supreme Court’s “reasonable and
necessary” standard.108 This deference to alleged state conservation led
Dean Getches to conclude that Justice Douglas favored what he
perceived to be environmental results over Indian treaty rights.109
Although Puyallup I decided that the state could regulate offreservation treaty fishing, it declined to rule on the state’s ban on net
fishing in the Puyallup River. Instead, the Court sent the matter back to
the state courts to determine whether the ban was a reasonable and
necessary conservation measure.110 Justice Douglas’ opinion did direct
the state courts to address the matter of equal protection implicit in the
treaty language “in common with.”111 But by deferring to the state’s
position that treaty fishing rights could be subject to state regulation
without giving close scrutiny as to whether those regulations were
indispensable to conservation, the Court seemed to accord the states a
significant discretion in controlling the exercise of treaty rights. Judge
Belloni would not give the deference to state regulation that Justice
Douglas implied in Puyallup I, realizing that, as Professor Johnson
predicted,112 deference to state regulation amounted to discrimination
against treaty rights.
105

Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398.
Id. at 398–99 (citing Tulee, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942) (“[W]hile the treaty leaves the
state with power to impose on Indians equally with others such restrictions of a purely
regulatory nature concerning the time and manner of fishing outside the reservation as
are necessary for the conservation of fish, it forecloses the state from charging the Indians
a fee of the kind in question here.”).
107 Tulee, 315 U.S. at 685.
108 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 399–401.
109 Getches, supra note 104, at 1632 n.284 (“Douglas favored Indians only when their
interests overlapped with other, higher concerns of his such as civil rights. He sharply
curbed Indian rights, going against established doctrine, when he feared that tribal sovereignty would clash with his preference for wildlife conservation.”). Puyallup I also relied
on a half-century old decision which suggested that the treaty fishing right at issue in that
case was merely a privilege, and thus subject to appropriate state regulation. Puyallup I,
391 U.S. at 399 (citing Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556, 563–64 (1916)).
110 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 401–02.
111 Id. at 393, 403. In Puyallup II, 414 U.S. 44, 48 (1973), Douglas clarified his Puyallup
I decision, reflecting a heightened awareness of the plight of Indian harvesters and the
discriminatory effect of the state regulations. Belatedly recognizing the state’s ongoing
discrimination, Douglas announced that there must be a fair allocation between Indian
fishing and non-Indian sports fishing. Id. at 48.
112 Johnson, supra note 74, at 228.
106
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III. THE BELLONI DECISION
This Part examines the fishing conflict that led to the Sohappy v.
Smith113 decision and the people who were instrumental in convincing
the federal government to bring suit on behalf of the tribes. It then
discusses Belloni’s ruling that required the state to ensure tribes had a
fair share of the harvest, as well as his insistence that the tribes must
have a voice in managing the fish runs.
A. The Intensifying Conflict in the 1960s
The decades-old conflict that led to Sohappy began to intensify in
the 1960s, due in large part to a significant decline in the salmon
population. In 1964, Oregon and Washington closed commercial fishing
on the Columbia River, based on information indicating a critical
decrease in summer chinook salmon.114 Tribes also closed their fisheries
in response to this data.115 In 1966, Oregon ordered state police to
strictly enforce commercial fishing regulations and impose closures on
the Columbia River.116 However, many treaty fishermen ignored both
state and tribal closures, believing that their treaty rights exempted
them from all regulation.117 Tribal fishermen also began to hold
demonstrations and “fish-ins,” to draw attention to what they perceived
as an escalating elimination of their treaty rights through state fishing
restrictions.118 As a result, Oregon arrested many tribal harvesters.119
One such fisherman was Richard Sohappy, a Yakama Indian tribal
member and decorated army veteran.120 During the summer of 1968,
Oregon state officials arrested Richard and his uncle David Sohappy for
fishing in the Columbia River with gillnets, contrary to state

113

302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969).
See Honorable Robert C. Belloni, Foreword to Berg, Let Them Do as They Have
Promised, supra note 4, at 311–12; see also John C. Gartland, Sohappy v. Smith: Eight
Years of Litigation over Indian Fishing Rights, 56 OR. L. REV. 680, 685 (1977); Harrison,
supra note 18, at 711.
115 Gartland, supra note 114, at 685.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 ALVIN J. ZIONTZ, A LAWYER IN INDIAN COUNTRY: A MEMOIR 87–89 (2009). During the
1960s and 1970s, treaty fishermen from tribes in both Oregon and Washington, all of
whom had similar treaty language reserving their fishing rights, were holding “fish-ins”
and other protests across the Pacific Northwest. See COHEN, supra note 11, at 75 (describing some fish-ins that occurred in Washington and Oregon). The protests drew national
support, with actors and celebrities such as Marlon Brando and Jay Silverheels (who
played Tonto on “The Lone Ranger” television show) demonstrating their support by participating in the fish-ins. See William Schulze, Brando Held, Freed in Fishing Dispute,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 3, 1964) https://perma.cc/JFK7-XV6E. Hundreds of
non-native university students, civil rights activists, professors, and others joined protests
across the nation.
119 See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 11, at 75–76.
120 Id. at 78.
114
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regulations.121 In response, Richard and David Sohappy, along with
twelve other Yakama treaty fishermen, filed suit against Oregon Fish
Commissioner Mckee Smith and other state game and fish officers,
challenging the state’s restrictions on treaty fishing and seeking to stop
the state’s arrests of treaty fishermen.122 Professor Johnson and two
other attorneys, David Hood and Fred Nolan, volunteered to litigate the
case for the fourteen individuals.123 The chief judge assigned the case to
Judge Robert C. Belloni, a newly appointed federal judge who would
eventually halt the increasing state restrictions on treaty fishing
rights.124
A significant factor that changed the dynamics of the tribes’ legal
battles over treaty rights in the 1960s was a shifting perspective of the
Department of Interior’s Office of the Solicitor. Throughout the early
twentieth century and into the 1960s, the Solicitor’s Office had been
only peripherally concerned with Indian rights, focusing mainly on
reclamation and public power issues.125 Moreover, many of the
Secretaries of Interior during the 1950s were champions of tribal
termination.126 Only a few attorneys in the Solicitor’s Office during the
1960s had any expertise or interest in Indian Law. One was Assistant
Regional Interior Solicitor, George Dysart, who had a great deal of
expertise in Indian law by the 1960s.127 Dysart would play a pivotal role
in protecting tribal treaty fishing rights in the coming decades.
121

Id. at 77–78.
Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. 899, 903–04 (D. Or. 1969); see COHEN, supra note 11, at 78.
123 COHEN, supra note 11, at 78.
124 See id.; CHARLES WILKINSON, MESSAGES FROM FRANK’S LANDING 49 (2000); Berg,
Let Them Do as They Have Promised, supra note 4, at 317. Belloni was born in Coos County, Oregon and earned an undergraduate degree from the University of Oregon in 1941
and a law degree in 1951 after serving as an Army officer in World War II. President
Lyndon B. Johnson appointed him to the federal district court in 1967. See Eric Pace, Obituary: Robert C. Belloni, 80, Judge Who Upheld Indian Fishing Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
15, 1999), https://perma.cc/8FES-YBF8. Belloni later stated that knew little about Indians
or their cultures prior to the case: “I had never had any particular call to be interested in
Indian affairs except as any other citizen is, proud of the history and ashamed of some of
it, too . . . . I didn’t know anything about these people . . . . I ended up with the highest respect for Indian people, those that I dealt with, the four tribes in particular.” Berg, Interview with Belloni, supra note 4.
125 See Reid Peyton Chambers, Implementing the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians after President Nixon’s 1970 Message to Congress on Indian Affairs: Reminiscences of
Reid Peyton Chambers, 53 TULSA L. REV. 395, 452 (2018).
126 Id. During the 1950s and 1960s, the federal government adopted an official policy of
tribal termination, in an effort to end the federal–tribal trust relationship. This so-called
termination era included terminating a number of tribes completely, transferring civil and
criminal jurisdiction over Indians on reservations to state governments, transferring control of educational policies designed to assimilate Indians, and relocating Indians from
reservations to urban cities; see, e.g., Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution
of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 149–53 (1977) (discussing the federal
termination policy).
127 Indian Fishing Rights: Hearings on S.J. Res. 170 and S.J. Res. 171 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 11 (1964) (statement by John A. Carver, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Department
122
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As the fishing controversy in the Pacific Northwest increased
during the 1960s, Dysart and U.S. Attorney Sidney Lezak became
increasingly concerned about the tribes’ fishing problems.128 Heightened
national awareness of, and activism regarding, the tribal fishing issue in
the Pacific Northwest pressured the federal government to take action
on behalf of the tribes, and in the early 1960s, the tribes requested
federal support to protect their treaty rights.129 The federal government
began supplying that support in April 1966, when the Department of
Justice authorized U.S. Attorneys to represent individual treaty
fishermen whom the state was arresting and charging with violations
its fishing regulations.130
Later in 1966, the Department of Justice issued a report on the
treaty fishing conflict.131 The report characterized as mere dictum the
Supreme Court’s statement in Tulee that the state had the authority to
impose on treaty fishing rights “restrictions of a purely regulatory
nature concerning the time and manner of fishing.”132 Instead, the
report emphasized that the state of Washington lacked authority to
regulate or restrict tribal members’ exercise of their treaty fishing
rights, even though state officials were arresting and threatening treaty
harvesters fishing in compliance with tribal regulations.133
As a result of the Justice Department’s initiative, U.S. Attorneys
helped defend treaty fishermen in state criminal prosecutions. However,
as Dysart himself noted, fighting individual court battles on behalf of a
single treaty fishermen in state court was inefficient and
unproductive.134 First, because treaty fishing rights are federal rights,
the issues were properly adjudicated in federal, not state court. Second,
individual criminal cases limited the tribal defense attorneys to the
facts of the individual situation rather than focusing on broader treaty
rights issues.135
Due to the limits imposed by case-by-case criminal prosecutions,
Dysart, Lezak, and other federal attorneys chose to pursue a different
path: persuading the Solicitor’s Office and the Department of Justice to
protect tribal fishing rights on a much broader scale. Along with other
treaty rights advocates, Dysart and Lezak prepared a comprehensive
of the Interior to the Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs concerning Dysart’s experience). Dysart, a humble, self-effacing attorney proved to be a dedicated advocate of tribal
treaty rights who quietly made things happen. Throughout the United States v. Oregon
case, Dysart made active efforts to make peace between the parties. Interview with Former Assistant U.S. Attorney Kris Olson (Feb. 25, 2019) [hereinafter “Olson Interview”].
128 Olson Interview, supra note 127.
129 Id.; see also COHEN, supra note 11, at 76–78.
130 Report of Assistant Attorney General Edwin L. Weisl, Jr. in Charge of the Land and
Natural Resources Division, 1966 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 294, 306 (1966).
131 Id. at 305.
132 Id. at 305–06 (quoting Tulee, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942)).
133 Id.
134 Berg, Let Them Do as They Have Promised, supra note 4, at 317 (quoting an interview with George Dysart (Dec. 6, 1989)).
135 Id. at 317 (quoting Dysart interview); Chambers, supra note 125, at 439.
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federal suit for declaratory and injunctive relief that would prove more
efficient than defending individual treaty fishermen accused of crimes in
state court.136
Dysart and Lezak faced an uphill battle to convince the
Departments of Justice and Interior attorneys to pursue the case, as
many federal attorneys thought that states had largely unfettered
discretion to regulate treaty fishing.137 According to long-time tribal
lawyer, Alvin Ziontz, “Dysart wrote a lengthy and analytical request
describing the history of state violation of Indian rights. With respect to
Oregon, he zeroed in on the blatant illegality of allocating Columbia
River salmon runs to the downstream non-Indian sport and commercial
fishermen to the detriment of the Indians upstream.”138 Dysart’s report
convinced the Interior and Justice Departments to initiate a federal
action against state regulation at the same time that Sohappy and
thirteen other Yakama tribal members filed Sohappy.139
The federal government had the option of intervening in the
Sohappy case. However, given state sovereign immunity, the Sohappy
treaty fishermen were able only to bring suit against state officials, not
the state itself.140 Dysart and the others working with him thus chose to
initiate a separate suit against Oregon itself, which enjoyed no
sovereign immunity against a suit brought by the federal government.141
The action that Dysart and the Justice Department planned would
require the state of Oregon to manage the fishery resource to “assure
the Indians a fair and equitable share of the salmon and steelhead
destined to reach the Indians’ ‘usual and accustomed’ fishing places.”142
Dysart’s efforts paid off. In September 1968, the United States filed
its complaint in United States v. Oregon.143 The four Columbia River
treaty tribes intervened in the case: the tribes of the Yakama, Umatilla,
and Warm Springs reservations and the Nez Perce Tribe.144 Given the
136 Berg, Let Them Do as They Have Promised, supra note 4, at 317 (quoting Dysart interview); Olson Interview, supra note 127.
137 Berg, Let Them Do as They Have Promised, supra note 4, at 317; Olson Interview,
supra note 127.
138 ZIONTZ, supra note 118, at 94.
139 Berg, Let Them Do as They Have Promised, supra note 4, at 317.
140 The 11th Amendment protects states from suits by individuals in federal, courts, see
for example Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890), although it does not apply to suits by
the federal government.
141 Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1656 (2002).
142 Honorable Robert C. Belloni, Foreword: Let Them Do as They Have Promised, supra
note 4, at 312.
143 Berg, Let Them Do as They Have Promised, supra note 4, at 317. Because Dysart
played such a substantial role in advocating for protection of tribal treaty rights, and because of his expertise in Indian law, Lezak cross-designated him as Special Assistant U.S.
Attorney in United States v. Oregon. Olson Interview, supra note 127.
144 The formal names of the tribes are the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation (the Walla Walla,
Cayuse, and Umatilla Tribes), the Nez Perce Indian Tribe of Idaho, and the Confederated
Tribes of the Warm Springs Indian Reservation. Berg, Let Them Do as They Have Promised, supra note 4, at 317.
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overlap of treaty rights issues, Judge Belloni consolidated the two cases,
Sohappy and United States v. Oregon, into a single proceeding in
1969.145
B. Analyzing the Sohappy Decision
In response to the federal allegation that the state was violating the
tribes’ treaty rights by failing to ensure a fair share of the fishery,
Oregon defended on the ground that, under the Supreme Court’s
Puyallup I decision, it had the same authority to regulate tribal
harvests as it did to regulate non-Indians.146 The state argued that the
Indians’ fishing rights did not warrant separate protection or
treatment.147 Judge Belloni disagreed. In memorable words, he stated
that the state’s position “would not seem unreasonable if all history,
anthropology, biology, prior case law and the intention of the parties to
the treaty were to be ignored.”148 In giving no deference to the state’s
interpretation, Belloni thus resoundingly affirmed the judicial role in
interpreting the promises made in Indian treaties.
Belloni reviewed the origin and reason for the federal government’s
treaties with the various Pacific Northwest tribes, emphasizing the
importance of construing the treaties consistent with the Indian canons
of construction, one of which stipulates that treaties are to be
interpreted as the tribes understood.149 Belloni quoted from the
Supreme Court’s Tulee decision to the effect that:
[i]t is [the courts’] responsibility to see that the terms of the treaty are
carried out, so far as possible, in accordance with the meaning they were
understood to have by the tribal representatives at the council and in a
spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to
protect the interests of a dependent people.150

Belloni recognized the vital importance of fish to the tribes throughout
their history and the tribal leaders’ concerns at the time of treatysigning that their right to fish at their usual and accustomed grounds be

145 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. 899, 904 (D. Or. 1969). The court severed United States v.
Oregon and Sohappy in 1977, United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1011 n.1 (9th Cir.
1981), and decided to continue litigation in the years since under the name of United
States v. Oregon. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 708 n.16.
146 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp at 907.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 905.
149 Id. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the validity of the Indian canons of construction in Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019); see infra note 246 and accompanying text;
see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02, 113–16 (Nell Jessup Newton
ed., 2012) (discussing the canons).
150 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 905 (quoting Tulee, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942)).
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protected.151 With this understanding, Belloni then analyzed the state’s
restrictions on treaty fishing.
The state’s claim that it could regulate tribal harvests just as it
could regulate other non-tribal fish harvests was soundly rejected by
Judge Belloni. The state maintained that its regulation met the
conservation necessity principle first articulated by the Supreme Court
in Tulee and reaffirmed in Puyallup I.152 But Belloni saw two limitations
on state regulation in Puyallup I, even if necessary for conservation.
First, the state regulation of treaty fishing could not discriminate
against tribal fishing; second, the regulations must, according to
Puyallup I, meet “appropriate standards.”153 Because he concluded that
the state’s claim to an unfettered right to regulate treaty fishing had
already been repeatedly rejected in Puyallup I, Tulee, Holcomb, Maison,
and Makah, Judge Belloni rejected the state’s position.154
To ascertain whether the state’s regulations were “necessary for the
conservation of the fish,”155 Belloni analyzed Puyallup I in some detail.
He concluded that the Supreme Court was clearly interpreting
“conservation in the sense of perpetuation or improvement of the size
and reliability of the fish runs.”156 The Court did not, according to Judge
Belloni, endorse any particular state program for allocating fish
harvests among particular user groups, harvest areas, or modes of
taking, so long as the conservation goal was achieved.157
Belloni was clear that the conservation necessity principle did not
allow the state to subordinate treaty fishing rights to other state
objectives or policies.158 Instead, the state could regulate treaty fishing
rights only when necessary for the conservation of the species.159
Additionally, the regulations must be the least restrictive method
possible for meeting conservation requirements.160 In a subsequent
unpublished opinion, he reiterated that requirement, holding that the
state must use every other alternative method of conserving the fish
runs, like restricting non-Indian harvesting, before regulating treaty

151

Id.
Id. at 906; see Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1967) (stating the treaty right to take
fish “at all usual and accustomed places” may be regulated by the state only when its
regulation “meets appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the Indians”);
Tulee, 315 U.S. at 684 (asserting the state can regulate the time and manner of treaty
fishing outside of the reservation when the restrictions are necessary for conservation of
fish).
153 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 907.
154 Id. at 907–08 (citing Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398–99; Tulee, 315 U.S. at 684–85; Holcomb, 382 F.2d 1013, 1013–15 (9th Cir. 1967); Maison, 314 F.2d 169, 171–74 (9th Cir.
1963); Makah, 192 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1951)).
155 Id. at 906–07.
156 Id. at 908 (interpreting Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398–99).
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 906 (citing Tulee, 315 U.S. at 684).
160 Id. at 908.
152
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fishing.161 He thus reinstated the high bar for state regulation of tribal
exercise of treaty fishing rights.162 To prove the conservation necessity of
a regulation, the state had to demonstrate that 1) a limit on tribal treaty
taking of fish was required for the perpetuation or stability of a fish run,
and 2) the proposed regulation restricting exercise of treaty fishing
rights was indispensable to the state’s ability to accomplish that
limitation.163
Restrictions on both the time and manner of treaty fishing,
including the type of gear the treaty fishermen use, had to meet those
requirements.164 Belloni also reiterated Maison’s holding that the
treaties reserved no rights for non-Indians.165 Instead, treaty fishermen
could fish in ways proscribed to non-Indians, and the state could not
limit the type of fishing gear treaty fishermen used simply on the basis
that non-Indians could not use that gear.166 Belloni determined that the
state failed to meet these standards in Sohappy; consequently, the
state’s regulation unlawfully discriminated against treaty rights.167
The Puyallup I Court previously announced that the state could not
qualify the tribes’ treaty “right to fish at all usual and accustomed
places,” which Belloni interpreted to mean “that the state cannot so
manage the fishery that little or no harvestable portion of the run
remains to reach the upper portions of the stream where the historic
Indian places are mostly located.”168 This interpretation was a critical
one for the tribes because the state had regulated fisheries in such a
way that a significant portion of fish runs were harvested before the
runs reached the tribes’ traditional fishing grounds.169 Then, due to
depleted fish runs, the state would impose conservation limits after the
fish runs had passed the Bonneville dam, thus forcing the treaty
fishermen to bear the burden of the conservation efforts.170 This

161

Sohappy v. Smith, No. 68-409, slip op. at 2–3 (D. Or. Oct. 10, 1969).
Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 907–08; Sohappy v. Smith, No. 68-409, slip op. at 2–3 (D.
Or. Oct 10, 1969); see also Timothy Weaver, Litigation and Negotiation: The History of
Salmon in the Columbia River Basin, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 677, 680–81 n.12 (1997) (discussing Belloni’s least restrictive alternative requirement).
163 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 908 (restating the Maison interpretation of Tulee that
Puyallup I ignored); see Maison, 314 F.2d 169, 172 (9th. Cir.1963).
164 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 908–09.
165 Id. at 911 (citing Maison, 314 F.2d at 174).
166 Id.
167 Id. at 910–11. Judge Belloni found this discrimination to be the equivalent of that
proscribed by the Ninth Circuit in Maison, 314 F.2d. at 173 (deciding that the state’s efforts to conserve fish for non-treaty commercial and sports harvesters, without regard for
treaty fishermen needs and use, failed to meet the conservation necessity requirement).
168 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 911 (citing Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1967).
169 Berg, Let Them Do as They Have Promised, supra note 4, at 316.
170 See Harrison, supra note 18, at 708; see also Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 908–11 (noting that the state set escapement goals (i.e., fish that “escaped” harvest) far below Bonneville Dam that gave priority to non-tribal commercial and sport fishing. The regulations
gave no consideration to tribal harvests above the dam.). See supra notes 156–157 and accompanying text (discussing Belloni’s analysis of Puyallup I in which he concluded that
162
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combination effectively prohibited treaty fishermen from harvesting,
imposing the full conservation burden on the tribes.171 Belloni’s
interpretation thus recognized the inherent discriminatory nature of the
state’s regulations and required the state to meet conservation goals in
a manner that did not unfairly burden treaty fishermen.
Belloni reiterated the Ninth Circuit’s suggestion in Makah that the
state and tribes agree to a cooperative plan to govern the state’s
regulation over treaty fishing rights.172 He then dismissed the state’s
contention that statehood diminished treaty fishing rights.173 Finally, in
the most significant long-term aspect of his decision, Judge Belloni
retained jurisdiction of the case to grant relief for further disputes that
arose from his decree.174 He was quite prescient in anticipating disputes
and foreseeing the need for continued judicial oversight:
This court cannot prescribe in advance all of the details of appropriate and
permissible regulation of the Indian fishery . . . . As the Government itself
acknowledges, “proper anadromous fishery management in a changing
environment is not susceptible of rigid pre-determination . . . . [T]he
variables that must be weighed in each given instance make judicial
review of state action, through retention of continuing jurisdiction, more
appropriate than overly-detailed judicial predetermination.”175

Belloni’s continuing jurisdiction over the case was essential to
implementing the principles he established in Sohappy. No judicial
appeal was forthcoming.
Five years after the Belloni decision, Judge George Boldt
interpreted the “fair share” principle to allocate to the Puget Sound
tribes up to half of the harvests.176 Judge Belloni promptly amended his
1969 order to apply that allocation to the Columbia.177 The states of
Oregon and Washington then appealed his 1974 amended order to the
Ninth Circuit, which in 1976 affirmed the 50 percent allocation as being
fair and practicable.178 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the 1974
order simply defined the amount required by the 1969 “fair share”

the Supreme Court was not clearly interpreting conservation in the sense of perpetuation
or improvement of the size and reliability of the fish runs).
171 See Harrison, supra note 18, at 708.
172 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 912 (citing Makah, 192 F.2d 224, 225 (9th Cir. 1951)).
173 Id. (citing Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 400); Holcomb, 382 F.2d 1013, 1014 (9th Cir.
1967).
174 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 911.
175 Id.
176 United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d and
remanded, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
177 The amended order decreed that “‘[t]he Indian treaty fishermen are entitled to have
the opportunity to take up to 50 percent of the harvest of the spring Chinook Salmon run
destined to reach the tribes’ usual and accustomed grounds and stations. Except insofar as
amended here, the 1969 judgment remains in full force and effect.’” See Sohappy v. Smith,
529 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting the 1974 order).
178 Id. at 573.

2020]

THE BELLONI DECISION AND ITS LEGACY

371

ruling, which was necessary given the states’ failure to manage their
resources in a manner that complied with Belloni’s 1969 decree.179 With
the “fair share” tied to a specific percentage of fish, Belloni ensured that
the treaty fishermen had a more substantial, concrete harvest share to
measure whether the state fairly allocated fish runs.
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance, implementation of the Boldt
decision faced substantial opposition in Washington, as both the state
and non-tribal harvesters resisted.180 When state courts upheld the
state’s claims that it lacked authority to implement the decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court to review the case, and its ensuing 6–3 decision
largely upheld Judge Boldt’s equal sharing formula (approved by Judge
Belloni) as necessary to prevent the state from “crowding out” the tribal
fishery.181
The Supreme Court’s ratification marked the Belloni decision as a
turning point in the courts’ recognition of treaty fishing rights,
expanding the scope beyond access to fishing sites and an insulation
from license fees to impose significant, systematic restrictions on state
regulation.182 Not only did it establish that the state must allocate
treaty fishermen a fair share of the harvest, it also re-established the
high bar for state regulation of treaty fishing that the Puyallup I
decision seemed to undermine the previous year.183 Judge Belloni
179
180

Id.

Like southern white fighting desegregation two decades earlier, the state of Washington and its citizens resisted the Boldt decision vigorously . . . . Widespread noncompliance with the state’s grudging efforts to implement the court’s orders occurred during 1975–77; shooting threats were even reported. Then, in 1977, in
response to a suit brought by non-native fishers, the Washington State Supreme
Court ruled that the state lacked authority to implement Judge Boldt’s sharing
formula, claiming it was contrary to both state statutes and the federal
Constitution. As a result Judge Boldt was forced to enter a series of orders that had the effect of directly managing the fishery. Although these orders were widely decried as
usurping the state’s role in managing the fishery and establishing the court as a
‘fishmaster,’ the orders were upheld again by the appeals court. . . .
SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 6, at 81. Affirming Judge Boldt’s authority to run
the fishery by judicial degree, the Ninth Circuit pointed to the state’s “extraordinary
machinations,” which were “the most concerted official and private efforts to frustrate a
decree of a federal court witnessed in this century.” Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. U.S.
District Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978).
181 Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
676, 682, 686–87 (1979) (concluding that neither the state nor the treaty tribes can destroy
each other’s harvest share, and that the “central principle” of the treaty right was that the
tribal right to “a natural resource that once was thoroughly and exclusively exploited by
the Indians secures so much as, but no more than, is necessary to provide the Indians with
a livelihood—that is to say, a moderate living.”).
182 See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 6, at 83–85 (also noting that the Belloni
and Boldt decisions induced a re-tribalization of Northwest tribes, eventual recognition of
the tribes as fish managers, an eventual alliance with the states to protect salmon habitat,
all of redounded to the benefit of the salmon resource).
183 See supra notes 105–111 and accompanying text.
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changed the course of Indian case law by requiring the state to use only
the least restrictive means of conserving the amount of fish necessary
for species’ survival.184 Further, he recognized the importance and
necessity of having a tribal voice in the management of fish, laying the
foundation for the co-management plans that the tribes and states
would later develop.185
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE BELLONI DECISION
This Part discusses the effect that Belloni and his decision in
Sohappy had on the management of the fish runs on the Columbia River
and its tributaries, emphasizing Judge Belloni’s role in inducing the
development of co-management plans. We then examine the evolution of
these co-management plans and explain some of the successes and
setbacks the tribes and states faced in developing and implementing
them.
A. The Role of the Court
Judge Belloni declared that treaty fishing rights must be co-equal
with the state’s objective of conserving fish runs for other user groups.186
The decision effectively required Oregon to completely change its
management of salmon harvests on the Columbia River.187 Because
Belloni recognized that the states’ ongoing management of the fish runs
might continue to be unfair to the tribes, he focused on ensuring that
the tribes had a role in the decision-making process of managing the fish
runs, ordering the state to give the tribes an opportunity “to participate
meaningfully” in the regulation of the fishery,188 in effect, recognizing a
kind of shared sovereignty over managing fish harvests.
Belloni anticipated that continuing conflicts between the tribe’s fair
share and the state’s conservation regulations could lead to a “commuter
run” to the courthouse.189 He therefore implored the parties to work
together to develop a co-management plan for the conservation and
allocation of anadromous fish in the Columbia River.190 Not until 1977
did the states actually develop a plan incorporating the principles

184

See supra notes 158–167 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 203–230 and accompanying text.
186 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. 899, 911 (D. Or. 1969).
187 See Harrison, supra note 18, at 708.
188 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 912 (ordering that the tribes must “be heard on the subject
[of state fishing regulations] and, consistent with the need for dealing with emergency or
changing situations on short notice, . . . be given appropriate notice and opportunity to
participate meaningfully in the rule-making process”); Harrison, supra note 18, at 713.
189 See Weaver, supra note 162, at 681; Harrison, supra note 18, at 709; Gartland, supra
note 114, at 680.
190 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 912; see Harrison, supra note 18, at 715–16 (describing
Belloni’s continual efforts to encourage the parties to cooperate over the next decade).
185
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Belloni established in his 1969 decree.191 His encouragement was
essential in convincing the parties to eventually meaningfully negotiate,
laying the groundwork for the agreements they would reach in later
decades. Although the Belloni decision was a critical step in ensuring
that tribes had a voice in both the allocation and the conservation of
fish, the fish runs continued to decline in the 1970s, leading to more
disputes as to how to fairly achieve both allocation and conservation
goals.192
B. The Evolution of Co-Management Plans
For several years following the Belloni decision, Oregon’s
interpretation of conservation continued to unfairly burden the tribes.
This discrimination was partly due to the location of tribal fisheries,
upstream from Bonneville Dam.193 In contrast, the non-Indian sport and
commercial fisheries were primarily below the dam.194 Since fish
counting did not occur until the runs reached the dam, the state would
begin to implement its conservation regulations once the fish passed the
dam, thereby limiting the allocation to treaty fishermen without
affecting the allocation to non-treaty fishermen.195 This management
coincided with the state’s priority of allocating fish to sports and nonIndian commercial fishermen, but was inconsistent with the Belloni
decision’s directive instructing the state to manage the fishery so that
treaty harvesters have co-equal rights with non-treaty fishers.196
Throughout the early 1970s, litigation continued. With no longterm conservation plan in place, state management of the fish runs
often occurred on a run-by-run basis.197 This ad hoc management forced
the tribes to ask the court for emergency injunctions, frequently leaving
the court no more than a few days to consider the issues and
arguments.198 Judge Belloni grew weary of waiting for the states to
191 The Columbia River Fish Management Plan, COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH
COMM’N, https://perma.cc/87UB-ZHZQ (last visited Apr. 18, 2020).
192 See Harrison, supra note 18, at 709, 713. In 1980, the states and the tribes formed a
surprising alliance in a successful effort to pressure Congress to elevate the status of fish
and wildlife preservation and restoration in what became known as the Northwest Power
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Brad L. Johnson, Promising a
Process for Parity: The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act
and Anadromous Fish Protection, 11 ENVTL. L. 497, 501–02 (1981) (analyzing the statute);
Michael C. Blumm, Implementing the Parity Promise: An Evaluation of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 14 ENVTL. L. 277, 281 (1984) (analyzing the ensuing restoration plan). See also infra note 201.
193 See Harrison, supra note 18, at 713–14.
194 Gartland, supra note 114, at 694 n.99.
195 Harrison, supra note 18, at 713–14; A Plan for Managing Fisheries on Stocks Originating from the Columbia River and Its Tributaries Above Bonneville Dam (1977) (entered
into pursuant to Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 912) [hereinafter “1977 Management Plan”].
196 See Gartland, supra note 114, at 695.
197 See Harrison, supra note 18, at 707–08.
198 Id. at 715.
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develop a more comprehensive management plan that involved tribal
cooperation to ensure a fair share allocation of the harvests.199
Therefore, in 1975 he ordered the tribes and states to cooperate on
developing a comprehensive fish management plan.200 His 1975 order
reflected the importance of tribal sovereign control over natural
resources in which they possessed reserved rights.201 Tribal–state comanagement, which would characterize co-management plans over the
next forty years, involved “shared decision-making responsibility with
federal and state governments and agencies where the exercise of such
agency authority would affect tribal rights.”202 In short, in order to
ensure tribal proprietary fishing rights, the tribes had to have some
sovereign control over harvest management. Belloni’s 1975 order was an
indispensable step in co-management plans, which gave the tribes and
states an alternative to the litigation they had used to resolve fishing
conflicts for decades.
After nearly a decade of more litigation and extensive negotiations,
the tribes and states finally adopted a five-year co-management plan in
1977.203 The plan called for joint management and fair allocation of the
harvestable fish.204 Despite this agreement, litigation between the tribes
and states continued. Many ensuing disputes related to the fact the plan
focused primarily on the allocation of harvest without effectively
addressing the conservation of the declining fish runs.205 Nor did the
plan address regulation of ocean harvest or fishing locations, times, or
quotas.206 Since salmon migrate from their inland spawning grounds to
the northern coasts of British Columbia and Alaska and back,
regulation of ocean fisheries was necessary to ensure adequate
conservation, especially because during the 1960s–1980s, Alaska and
British Columbia fishers harvested a majority of Columbia River
harvests.207
199

Id. at 709, 715–16.
Id. at 716.
201 Order at 5, Sohappy v. Smith, No. 68-513 (D. Or. Aug. 20, 1975), discussed in Harrison, supra note 18, at 716–19; see also Ed Goodman, Protecting Habitat for Off-Reservation
Tribal Hunting and Fishing Rights: Tribal Comanagement as a Reserved Right, 30 ENVTL.
L. 279, 333–34 (2000) (discussing Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 238 (9th Cir. 1974)
(recognizing the Yakama Tribe’s right to exercise police powers at off-reservation usual
and accustomed fishing grounds with respect to tribal members exercising treaty rights)
and United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 256–58 (W.D. Mich. 1979) (holding that
the Chippewa Tribes reserved the right to regulate tribal fishing at off-reservation traditional fishing grounds, preempting state regulations)).
202 Goodman, supra note 201, at 336; see infra notes 203–230 and accompanying text.
203 See 1977 Management Plan, supra note 195.
204 COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM’N, supra note 191; see Gartland, supra
note 114, at 700; see also 1977 Management Plan, supra note 195.
205 See 1977 Management Plan, supra note 195.
206 See United States v. Oregon, 699 F. Supp. 1456, 1459 (D. Or. 1988), aff’d, 913 F.2d
576 (9th Cir. 1990); Harrison, supra note 18, at 709, 717–18.
207 Interview with Laurie Jordan, Columbia River Inter-tribal Fish Commission (Feb.
28, 2019) [hereinafter “Jordan Interview”]. Overharvesting of Columbia River-origin salmon off the coasts of British Columbia and Alaska eventually led Canada and the United
200
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The 1977 plan expired in 1982.208 The next year, the parties were
back in court, litigating the same conservation issues over which the
parties struggled since the 1969 Sohappy decision.209 In 1983, the
Columbia River Compact, an interstate agency that regulates
commercial fishing on the Columbia River, established regulations for
the 1983 fall fish runs.210 These regulations were more restrictive on
treaty fishing, both in terms of duration and the geographic area of
harvests, than those proposed by the tribes. The tribes responded by
seeking an injunction to prevent the states from enforcing the
regulations.211 District Judge Walter Craig—one of Judge Belloni’s
successors212—determined that the states’ regulations failed to meet
criteria of being the least restrictive methods of regulating fish for
conservation purposes by again subordinating the protection of treaty
fishing rights to other state priorities.213 Consequently, the court
enjoined the states from enforcing the 1983 regulations and ordered the
tribes and states to negotiate a new management plan.214 Washington
and Idaho appealed, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision in 1985, concluding that the states’ regulations failed to comply
with the standards established in Puyallup I, U.S. v. Oregon, and
Sohappy, and therefore violated the tribes’ treaty rights.215

States to agree to the Pacific Salmon Treaty in 1985 and amendments in 1999, see
SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 6, at 161–72.
208 See 1977 Management Plan, supra note 195.
209 See Harrison, supra note 18, at 709, 720.
210 Oregon and Washington have shared concurrent jurisdiction over the Columbia River since 1853. Act of Mar. 2, 1853, 10 Stat. 172, 179 (1853). A 1918 compact continued the
two states’ concurrent jurisdiction. Act of Apr. 8, 1918, Pub. L. No. 64-123, 40 Stat. 515
(1918); see United States v. Oregon, 769 F.2d 1410, 1413 (9th Cir. 1985).
211 United States v. Oregon, 769 F.2d at 1413.
212 After twelve years of presiding over the case, in 1980 Belloni surprisingly recused
himself from the case. Despite his lack of familiarity with Indian law when he was first
assigned the case in 1968, he startled courtroom observers by explaining that he could no
longer be fair and impartial. Later, in an interview in 1989, he discussed his reasons for
recusal:
I had spent all this time seeing Indians in lawsuit after lawsuit, winning these suits
but still failing to get the fish to which they were entitled. This was because they
didn’t have much power with state agencies because the Indians don’t have much
voting power . . . I came to the point where it became frustrating to me . . . to be
continually finding points in favor of the Indians when they deserved it, and then
later see . . . . the rulings went disobeyed [by the state]. There were end runs
around them. There were ingenious ways of figuring out interpretations contrary to
the spirit of the decision.
Berg, Interview with Belloni, supra note 4.
213 United States v. Oregon, 769 F.2d at 1412.
214 United States v. Oregon, No. 68-513 (D. Or. Sept. 1983), as discussed in United
States v. Oregon, 769 F.2d 1410, 1413–14 (9th Cir. 1985).
215 Idaho intervened in United States v. Oregon in 1983. Puyallup, 745 F.2d 550, 551
(9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Oregon, 769 F.2d at 1418 (citing Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392,
397–98 (1968)).
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The tribes and the states continued to negotiate from 1983 to 1988,
with the district court playing a role in overseeing the negotiations and
settling disputes.216 In 1988, a decade after the initial plan, the tribes
and states agreed to a new ten-year Columbia River Fish Management
Plan (1988 plan), which Judge Malcolm Marsh, another of Judge
Belloni’s successors, approved in October 1988.217
The 1988 plan included not only harvest limits but also established
“specific goals, timetables, and methods for cooperative management” of
both natural and hatchery fish for Columbia River Basin fish runs in
Idaho, Oregon, and Washington.218 The plan also called upon both the
tribes and states to construct new hatcheries on some of the Columbia
River tributaries in order to increase salmon run sizes,219 expanding the
role of the plan beyond harvest management. A key aspect of the 1988
plan concerned its provisions for resolving potential disputes and
changed circumstances in advance, rather than as they arose on a
seasonal basis.220 These dispute resolution procedures reflected the
parties’ growing sophistication in how to cooperatively manage the
fishery.221
In 1998, the 1988 plan expired. Over the next decade, the parties
were able to reach only short-term agreements. These agreements
amounted to stopgap measures that managed the fish runs in specific
years, rather than plans addressing long-term, ongoing conservation
and allocation issues. Then, in 2008, after years of negotiations, the
parties finally agreed to a new ten-year plan.222 The 2008 plan
216 The five tribes are the four mentioned supra note 144, as well as the ShoshoneBannock tribes, which were allowed to intervene in 1986 because their reservation is located along the Snake River, the principal tributary of the Columbia River. United States
v. Oregon, 122 F.R.D. 571, 573 (D. Or. 1988), aff’d, 913 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1990); see also
COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM’N, supra note 191; Goodman, supra note 201,
at 349.
217 United States v. Oregon, 699 F. Supp. 1456, 1457 (D. Or. 1988), aff’d, 913 F.2d 576
(9th Cir. 1990) (approving the 1988 plan).
218 SUMMARY OF U.S. V. OREGON AND THE COLUMBIA RIVER FISH MANAGEMENT PLAN 2
(1988); NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, COLUMBIA RIVER FISH MANAGEMENT
PLAN 84 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 MANAGEMENT PLAN].
219 SUMMARY OF U.S. V. OREGON AND THE COLUMBIA RIVER FISH MANAGEMENT PLAN,
supra note 218, at 2–4. Many critics believe that salmon hatcheries—because of their adverse effects on spawning salmon due to disease, overcrowding, and genetic drift—are a
false hope for salmon restoration. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 6, at 83–86.
220 See SUMMARY OF U.S. V. OREGON AND THE COLUMBIA RIVER FISH MANAGEMENT
PLAN, supra note 218, at 3–4.
221 Jordan Interview, supra note 207; see also Goodman, supra note 201, at 350 (describing the plan’s provisions for dealing with disputes and the changing circumstances of the
fish runs).
222 Jordan Interview, supra note 207; All Parties’ Joint Motion and Stipulated Order
Approving 2008–2017 United States v. Oregon Management Agreement, United States v.
Oregon, No. 3:68-cv-00513-KI (D. Or. Aug. 11, 2008). The plan was approved by the court
as a stipulated order. Joint Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion to Reconsider, Alter
or Amend This Court’s March 19, 2018 Orders Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)
at 6, United States v. Oregon, Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice, No. 3:68-cv0513-MO (D. Or. May 21, 2018) [hereinafter Tribes’ Joint Memorandum in Support].
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reestablished a co-management framework that reduced the need for
court resolution of disputes.223
With the 2008 plan about to expire, the parties succeeded in
agreeing to a new ten-year plan, which the court approved in March
2018.224 Because the state and tribes have differing views on the effect
of hydropower operations,225 this new agreement was basically a
continuation of the 2008 agreement.226 Consequently, one of its
shortcomings is that it makes no effort to resolve larger conservation
issues like balancing federal hydropower operations with the
conservation of endangered species.227 The plan does, however, provide
the parties a procedural framework within which to attempt to resolve
hydropower versus conservation goals in the future.228
Through several generations of plans, the parties have negotiated
agreements establishing collaborative fishery management that
reflected a spirit of cooperation between the tribes and states that did
not exist prior to the Sohappy decision.229 Although they have often
223 Defendant State of Oregon’s Response to Joint Motion to Reconsider, Alter or Amend
March 19, 2018 Orders at 2, United States v. Oregon, No. 3:68-cv-0513-MO (D. Or. May 7,
2018) [hereinafter Oregon’s Response to Joint Motion].
224 Order Approving 2018–2027 United States v. Oregon Management Agreement,
United States v. Oregon, No. 3:68-cv-0513-MO (D. Or. Mar. 19, 2018).
225 See Tribes’ Joint Memorandum in Support, supra note 222, at 18. One disagreement
concerned the Bonneville Power Association’s (BPA’s) settlement with the state of Washington and three of the tribes, in which they agreed to withdraw from ongoing litigation
over the federal government’s failure to comply with the requirements of the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) concerning the operations of Columbia Basin federal dam in return for
$900 million to be used for habitat restoration over ten years. The state of Oregon and the
Nez Perce did not sign on, refusing to take money from BPA to withdraw from litigation.
See Michael C. Blumm, The Columbia River Gorge and the Development of American Natural Resources Law: A Century of Significance, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 22 (2012) (discussing the so-called Columbia Basin Accords).
226 Jordan Interview, supra note 207; Tribes’ Joint Memorandum in Support, supra
note 222, at 6.
227 Those issues have been left to ESA litigation before another federal judge in the district court of Oregon, Michael Simon. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm et al., Still Crying Out
For a “Major Overhaul” After All These Years—Salmon and Another Failed Biological
Opinion on Columbia Basin Hydroelectric Operations, 47 ENVTL. L. 287, 307 (2017) (examining the failure of the federal 2014 biological opinion to satisfy the ESA); Michael C.
Blumm & Doug DeRoy, The Fight Over Columbia Basin Salmon Spills and the Future of
the Lower Snake River Dams, 9 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 5–13 (2019) (discussing
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 886 F.3d 803, 814–24 (9th Cir. 2018),
the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of the district court’s injunction requiring federal agencies
to spill water at federal dams to facilitate downstream salmon migration to fulfill ESA obligations).
228 COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM’N, supra note 191 (discussing the dispute
resolution procedures laid out to help parties resolve conflicts); Tribes’ Joint Memorandum
in Support, supra note 222, at 6, 23 (discussing the benefits of the “continuing procedural
framework” allowing the parties to resolve continuing disputes).
229 United States’ Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion to Reconsider, Alter, or
Amend this Court’s March 19, 2018 Orders Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)(6)
at 2, 4, United States v. Oregon, No. 3:68-cv-0513-MO (D. Or. Apr. 16, 2018) [hereinafter
U.S. Memorandum in Support]; Oregon’s Response to Joint Motion, supra note 223, at 2
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struggled to reconcile their diverging views as to how best to manage
the allocation of fish harvests between the tribal and state fisheries,
their efforts have also produced what may be the most longstanding
example of co-management in the United States.230 Considering the
decades of tribal–state conflicts over salmon and declining salmon runs,
the efforts of the tribes and states to work together to ensure a fair
allocation of salmon harvests represents a marked shift in the history of
Columbia River fish management.
C. Continuing Court Jurisdiction
Although the four generations of plans reflect the parties’ successful
co-management of the fish resource, there remains a pressing need for
the court’s continuing jurisdiction. The parties have continued to
dispute elements of the plans throughout the last fifty years, and the
reviewing court has been essential to resolving these disputes.231
So it was quite a surprise when, in March 2018, District Judge
Michael Mosman—another of Judge Belloni’s successors232—in

(recognizing that “substantial progress in collaborative management of fisheries over the
course of nearly 50 years has been made while under the court’s explicit statement of ‘retained jurisdiction’”); Jordan Interview, supra note 207; Harrison, supra note 18, at 723;
State of Washington’s Response to Joint Motion to Reconsider, Alter, or Amend this
Court’s March 19, 2018 Orders Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(E) and 60(B)(6) at 3, United
States v. Oregon, No. 3:68-cv-0513-MO (D. Or. May 7, 2018) [hereinafter Washington’s
Response to Joint Motion] (declaring that the state of Washington has “grown from that
past and the State has fully embraced the need to implement treaty rights as a distinct
obligation of its fishery management”).
230 COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM’N, supra note 191; see Harrison, supra
note 18, at 713. Since the late 1970s, the states and tribes, with the assistance of the federal government, have collaborated in creating the Fish and Wildlife Program to restore
salmon runs in the Columbia Basin under the Northwest Power Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839–
839h (2012). Although that program is not a co-management plan, tribes have an important consultative role in its development and implementation. See Nw. Res. Info. Ctr. v.
Nw. Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1395 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting a program approved by the four Northwest states because it failed to give sufficient deference to the
recommendations of federal and state fishery agencies and the Columbia Basin tribes). No
doubt the cooperation between the tribes and state fishery agencies in the Northwest
Power Act program helped to encourage similar cooperation in the plan to manage Columbia Basin harvests. The evolution of the Columbia Basin program, including the important
role played by a coalition of tribes with federal and state fishery agencies, is sketched in
some detail in SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 6, at 139–60. In some respects, the
program has been eclipsed in recent years by the federal government’s repeated failure to
comply with ESA concerning thirteen listed salmon species. See, e.g., Blumm & DeRoy,
supra note 227, at 5–19 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of Judge Simon’s directive that federal dams spill water to facilitate downstream salmon migration in order to
comply with the ESA).
231 Jordan Interview, supra note 207 (explaining that the parties have often disagreed
on whether and how to implement methods of conserving endangered fish species in the
face of continued hydropower operations).
232 Judge Mosman was assigned the case in 2018. United States v. Oregon, N.W. POWER
& CONSERVATION COUNCIL, https://perma.cc/BH4X-ECU5 (last visited Apr. 18, 2020).
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approving the 2018 plan, unexpectedly dismissed the case without
prejudice.233 The states of Idaho, Washington, and Oregon, all five of the
tribes now party to the case, as well as the United States Department of
Justice quickly filed motions seeking clarification of the dismissal and
requesting reconsideration.234
The federal government and the tribes opposed the dismissal and
listed numerous disputes and emergency injunction motions throughout
the forty-nine years of the parties’ negotiations.235 According to the
tribes, in just the period between 2002 and 2008 alone, the court
“presided over 40 status conferences with the parties to ascertain,
encourage and order the parties’ negotiation of a successor long-term
agreement.”236 They viewed the court as a neutral overseer, providing
timely resolution of disputes and whose presence was critical in
fostering growing amicable working relationships among the parties.237
Even more essentially, continuing court jurisdiction has encouraged
the parties to collaborate and minimized the number of disputes that
the parties bring to the court.238 The federal government responded to
Judge Mosman’s initial order by reiterating Judge Belloni’s 1969
statement that “[c]ontinuing the jurisdiction of this court in the present
cases may, as a practical matter, be the only way of assuring the parties
an opportunity for timely and effective judicial review of such
233 United States v. Oregon, Order Approving 2018–2027 United States v. Oregon Management Agreement, No. 3:68-cv-0513-MO (D. Or. Mar. 19, 2018); United States v. Oregon, Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice, No. 3:68-cv-0513-MO at 1 (D. Or. Mar. 19,
2018).
234 The five tribes are: Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation,
the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation (the Walla Walla, Cayuse, and
Umatilla Tribes), the Nez Perce Indian Tribe of Idaho, the Confederated Tribes of the
Warm Springs Indian Reservation and the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes. Plaintiffs’ Joint Motion to Reconsider, Alter, or Amend this Court’s March 19, 2018 Orders Pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)(6) at 1–2, United States v. Oregon, (D. Or. Mar.19, 2018) (No.
3:68-cv-0513-MO) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Joint Motion]; U.S. Memorandum in Support,
supra note 229; State of Idaho’s Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion to Reconsider,
Alter, or Amend this Court’s March 19, 2018 Orders Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(E) and
60(B)(6), United States v. Oregon, (D. Or. Mar. 19, 2018) (No. 3:68-cv-0513-MO) [hereinafter Idaho’s Response to Joint Motion]; Oregon’s Response to Joint Motion, supra note 223;
Washington’s Response to Joint Motion, supra note 229.
235 U.S. Memorandum in Support, supra note 229, at 4; Tribes’ Joint Memorandum in
Support, supra note 222, at 4–5; see, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 769 F.2d 1410, 1412
(9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Columbia River Compact’s fishery regulations violated
Indian treaty fishing rights); see also United States v. Oregon, 718 F.2d 299, 305 (9th Cir.
1983) (upholding an injunction against a Compact regulation that restricted the geographical area of a treaty fishery).
236 Tribes’ Joint Memorandum in Support, supra note 222, at 5.
237 U.S. Memorandum in Support, supra note 229, at 14; Oregon’s Response to Joint
Motion, supra note 223, at 2 (recognizing that “substantial progress in collaborative management of fisheries over the course of nearly 50 years has been made while under the
court’s explicit statement of ‘retained jurisdiction’”); Jordan Interview, supra note 207.
238 U.S. Memorandum in Support, supra note 229, at 15; see also Tribes’ Joint Memorandum in Support, supra note 222, at 5, 15–19 (stating that the court’s continuing jurisdiction assists the parties in resolving disputes before the disputes reach the court).
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restrictions should such review become necessary.”239 In negotiating the
2018 plan, both the federal government and the tribes emphasized that
all parties agreed to its terms with the understanding that the district
court would continue its jurisdiction over the case. Indeed, had the
parties known that the reviewing judge would dismiss the case and
terminate the court’s jurisdiction, they claimed they would have
negotiated much broader terms than those contained in the 2018
plan.240
Judge Mosman responded to the motions to reconsider by issuing
an order that continued the court’s jurisdiction over the case but
administratively closed it.241 What this means is not quite clear going
forward in terms of the continuing jurisdiction established in Judge
Belloni’s 1969 decision.242 The parties expressed the unanimous
sentiment that the court should maintain a continuing role interpreting
the effect of treaty rights on long-term fish harvests and conservation
issues.243
One factor that distinguishes this case from others is that all the
parties in United States v. Oregon are sovereigns, which argues for
continuing judicial oversight because sovereign immunity would
preclude both the states and the tribes from seeking relief against the
other unless the federal government participated.244 A half-century after
Judge Belloni retained continuing jurisdiction over the case, all parties
in the case opposed a judicial dismissal.245 There is perhaps no better
evidence of the wisdom of the Belloni decision.
V. LEGACY
Judge Belloni’s rejection of the state of Oregon’s claimed defense
that its regulation of tribal fishing was reasonable was pathbreaking.
Without reciting them in detail, he employed the canons of treaty
239 U.S. Memorandum in Support, supra note 229, at 13 (quoting Sohappy, 302 F. Supp.
899, 911 (D. Or. 1969)).
240 U.S. Memorandum in Support, supra note 229, at 5; Tribes’ Joint Memorandum in
Support, supra note 222, at 25–26.
241 Order Granting Parties Request for Clarification and Amending the Order Approving 2018–2027 United States v. Oregon Management Agreement at 2, United States v. Oregon, No. 3:68-cv-0513-MO (D. Or. May 21, 2018).
242 Several attorneys involved in the case at the U.S. v. Oregon: 50th Anniversary Symposium indicated that they thought that the administrative closure of the case, whatever
it means, would not preclude a party from raising implementation issues to the court,
since the court retained jurisdiction, which is a judicially approved settlement agreement.
243 See, e.g., U.S. Memorandum in Support, supra note 229, at 9–10; Tribes’ Joint Memorandum in Support, supra note 222, at 5–6, 12; see supra notes 235–240 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 140–142 and accompanying text.
245 U.S. Memorandum in Support, supra note 229, at 5; Tribes’ Joint Memorandum in
Support, supra note 222, at 25–26; Oregon’s Response to Joint Motion, supra note 223, at
2–3; Idaho’s Response to Joint Motion, supra note 234, at 2; Washington’s Response to
Joint Motion, supra note 229, at 2.
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interpretation246 to dismiss the state’s allegation. Its facially
nondiscriminatory regulation was as unsupportable247 as it was
inconsistent with “history, anthropology, biology, prior case law, and the
intention of the parties to the treaty.”248 Despite the Supreme Court’s
cursory treatment of the state regulation at issue in Puyallup I,249 he
insisted that the state demonstrate that its regulation was both
nondiscriminatory and required for the perpetuation of the species.250
Belloni’s interpretation of the conservation necessity defense
required the state to treat the tribal fishery separate from the nonIndian fishery,251 and it peered beyond mere facial nondiscrimination,
demanding that the state shoulder the burden of showing that its
regulation was the least restrictive method on tribal harvests possible
and still preserve the fish runs.252 This requirement proved difficult for
the state to meet because it could require cutbacks in non-Indian
harvests. Belloni’s interpretation of conservation necessity, based on
246 See supra notes 149–151 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1011–13 (2019), reinforced the Court’s commitment to
the treaty canons of interpretation. The Cougar Den Court analyzed whether the state of
Washington could tax fuel transported by Cougar Den, a company chartered by the tribe
and owned by a Yakama tribal member. Id at 1006. The Yakama treaty expressly reserved
to the tribe the “right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all
public highways.” Treaty with the Yakima, U.S.- Yakama Nation, art. 3, June 9, 1855, 12
Stat. 951 (“[I]f necessary for the public convenience, roads may be run through said reservation; and on the other hand, the right of way with free access from the same to the nearest public highway is secured to them; as also the right, in common with citizens of the
United States, to travel on all public highways.”). Both the lower state court and the
Washington Supreme Court ruled that the treaty promise preempted the state fuel tax
against the application of the fuel tax and in favor of the Yakama tribal company, and the
U.S. Supreme Court, somewhat surprisingly, affirmed, 5–4. Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. at
1006, 1016. The Court’s majority consisted of a three-justice plurality written by Justice
Breyer, for Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, together with a concurrence by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Ginsberg. Id. The plurality cited Winans, Tulee, Seufert Brothers,
and Fishing Vessel, in declaring that the treaty language “in common with” must be interpreted as the Yakama would have understood it. Id. at 1012. As a result, the treaty’s reservation of tribal right to travel on highways off-reservation enabled them to sell fuel onreservation exempt from state taxation. Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence may signal that a
tribal advocate has ascended to the Court:

Really, this case just tells an old and familiar story. The State of Washington includes millions of acres that the Yakamas ceded to the United States under significant pressure. In return, the government supplied a handful of modest promises.
The State is now dissatisfied with the consequences of one of those promises. It is a
new day, and now it wants more. But today and to its credit, the Court holds the
parties to the terms of their deal. It is the least we can do.
Id. at 1021 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
247 See supra notes 152–154 and accompanying text.
248 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
249 See supra notes 96–112 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 156–160 and accompanying text.
251 See supra notes 152–154 and accompanying text (rejecting the state’s argument that
it need not treat the tribal fishery separately).
252 See supra notes 155–167 and accompanying text.
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substantive fairness, has stood the test of time.253 In fact, the Supreme
Court, in its recent Wyoming v. Herrera decision, reaffirmed the
centrality of the conservation necessity defense.254 Future
interpretations of the application of conservation necessity will likely
start with Belloni’s interpretation of the defense.
Judge Belloni’s decision to use continuing jurisdiction to oversee
implementation of his decree was, of course, pivotal, as was his call for
the state to ensure the tribes’ “meaningful participation” in the
regulatory process.255 The federal court thus became a central
component in developing co-management plans, reworking federal–state
relations along the way. The federal government’s role should not be
overlooked, as officials like George Dysart and Sid Lezak urged the
court to restrain the state’s regulatory discretion.256 The co-management
plans that ensued helped Judge Belloni avoid the day-to-day
management of Columbia River harvests required of Judge Boldt in
Puget Sound.257
Effective co-management required the tribes to develop scientific,
technical, and legal expertise. That led to the founding of the Columbia
River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission in 1977,258 a chief legacy of the
Belloni decision, for it fostered inter-tribal cooperation as well as
eventually a surprising collaborative spirit between the tribes and the
state, which worked to the benefit of the salmon resource.259 Finally, not
to be overlooked is the educative effect of Judge Belloni’s decision. Not
only Judge Boldt but other courts relied on the Belloni decision to
articulate the nature of treaty rights and the effects on state regulation,
including, surprisingly enough, state courts like the Washington

253 See Monte Mills, Beyond the Belloni Decision: Sohappy v. Smith and the Modern Era
of Tribal Treaty Rights, 50 ENVTL. L. 387, 411–14 (2020) (explaining recent case law).
254 See supra note 78.
255 See supra notes 174–175 and accompanying text (discussing continuing jurisdiction),
supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing meaningful participation).
256 See supra notes 127–128, 136 and accompanying text.
257 The intransigence of the state agencies in Washington concerning implementing
Judge Boldt’s decision caused the judge and his successors to assume “fishmaster” status,
issuing nearly daily orders to manage fish harvests. Those orders eventually consumed
two volumes of published reports. See UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON, 1974–1985 (Thomson Reuters, vol. 1, 2015); UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON 1985–2013 (Thomson Reuters,
vol. 2, 2015).
258 See The Founding of CRITFC, COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM’N,
https://perma.cc/RNZ9-7A84 (last visited Apr. 18, 2020).
259 See supra notes 229–230 and accompanying text (discussing the tribal and state collaboration in the formulation of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program); see generally Michael C. Blumm, Implementing the Parity Promise: An Evaluation of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 14 ENVTL. L. 277, 284, 286 (1984) (discussing the
Northwest Power Act’s elevation of Columbia Basin tribes to a status co-equal to the
states in the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program and the ensuing set of comprehensive program recommendations submitted by a coalition of tribes and states).
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Supreme Court.260 Going forward, the Belloni decision’s effect on other
judges will be one of its principal legacies.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Belloni decision altered the trajectory of state regulation of
treaty fishing rights. Only the year before, the Supreme Court’s
Puyallup I decision seemed to lower the bar for the requirements state
regulations had to meet in order to restrict treaty fishing rights.261 A
lower bar for state regulation would have surely continued the erosion of
treaty fishing rights. But Judge Belloni’s analysis of the conservation
necessity exception for state regulation reinstated a high bar for state
regulation by requiring that the regulations be the least restrictive
means possible for ensuring that conservation needs are met.262
In a larger sense, the Belloni decision is a reminder of the critical
role that federal courts can play a counterweight to democratic decision
making—as the Oregon and Washington legislatures and agencies of
that era never would have allocated a fair share without an
authoritative decision from a federal court.263 Official resistance was
widespread: as the Ninth Circuit recognized in affirming Judge Boldt’s
260 See infra note 266 and accompanying text (discussing Cougar Den and Washington
v. Buchanan).
261 See supra notes 85–112 and accompanying text (discussing Puyallup I’s apparent
erosion of treaty rights).
262 See supra notes 158–163 and accompanying text.
263 See, e.g., supra notes 208–215 and accompanying text. For another example of the
critical role of the courts in vindicating treaty rights, consider the so-called “culverts case,”
an outgrowth of the Boldt decision. When the tribes filed suit in what became the Boldt
decision in 1970, they not only sought a fair allocation of the salmon resource, they also
asked for hatchery fish to be included in the allocation and for protection of salmon habitat. Judge Boldt retired after the Supreme Court affirmed his equal sharing decision, but
a successor, Judge William Orrick, ruled that hatchery fish were included in tribes’ treaty
allocation, and an en banc Ninth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d
1353, 1358–60 (9th Cir. 1985), aff’g 506 F. Supp. 187, 198–99 (W.D. Wash. 1980). But the
Ninth Circuit refused to decide the habitat issue, declaring that doing so by declaratory
judgment in the absence of a concrete factual dispute would be judicially “imprudent.” Id.
at 1357.
The habitat issue lingered for another two decades, until another of Judge Boldt’s
successors, Judge Ricardo Martinez, ruled in 2007 that the state of Washington’s road culverts blocking salmon migration violated the treaty right. United States v. Washington,
2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 22, 2007). Six years later, after negotiations between
the state and tribes broke down, he issued detailed injunctive relief which required,
among other measures, fixing some 800 barrier culverts by 2030. United States v. Washington, 2013 WL 1334391 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 2013). The state’s resistance to the injunction led to the Ninth Circuit’s unqualified affirmance. United States v. Washington, 853
F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2017). See Michael C. Blumm, Indian Treaty Fishing Rights and the
Environment: Affirming the Right to Habitat Protection and Restoration, 92 WASH. L. REV.
1 (2017). After Justice Kennedy recused himself (due to his participation in the case when
he was a Ninth Circuit judge), the Court divided 4–4, affirming the Ninth Circuit’s approval of the injunction without opinion. Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832
(2018).
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decision, apart from desegregation cases, the state of Washington and
its citizens engaged in the “most concentrated official and private efforts
to frustrate a decree of a federal court witnessed in this century.”264 So,
while the Belloni decision came over eight decades after federal courts
first began to interpret the meaning of the Stevens Treaties,265
reflecting the long, winding trail of achieving justice through the courts,
there is no other obvious way to vindicate treaty rights.
Although the arc of justice through the judiciary may be slow-going,
court decisions can serve educative functions, as seems to be evident
from recent decisions of the Washington state courts.266 The surprising
metamorphosis of those state courts is a product of federal court
decisions like Judge Belloni’s. So is the recognition of the political
branches of government. For a prominent example, in 1980, Congress
embraced the comprehensive plans that Judge Belloni called for in the
Northwest Power Act,267 a statute which placed the tribes and the states
on equal footing in authorizing a Columbia Basin fish and wildlife
restoration program to compensate for damage inflicted by federal
dams, a program based on best available science and consistent with
264 Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. U.S. Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir.
1978).
265 See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Taylor).
266 The transformation of the Washington courts was signaled in the Washington Supreme Court’s surprisingly sensitive treatment of treaty hunting rights in State v. Buchanan, 978 P.2d 1070, 1080–81 (Wash. 1999), in which the court decided that the treaty
hunting right could extend to lands not expressly ceded in a treaty if they were historically
used by tribal members. And in the recent Cougar Den case, see supra text accompanying
note 246, both the lower state court and the Washington Supreme Court upheld the
Yakama’s treaty right, employed the rules of treaty interpretation. Cougar Den Inc. v.
Dep’t of Licensing, No. 14-2-03851-7, 2015 WL 13762927 (Wash. Super. Aug. 18, 2015),
aff’d, 392 P.3d 1014, 1015–16 (Wash. 2017), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1007–08 (2019). These
decisions may be counted as a legacy of the educative influence of the Belloni decision. As
a measure of how far the Washington courts have evolved, consider State v. Towessnute,
154 P. 805, 807 (Wash. 1916), in which the racist approach of the Washington Supreme
Court to treaty rights was more than evident:

The premise of Indian sovereignty we reject. The treaty is not to be interpreted in
that light. At no time did our ancestors, in getting title to this continent, ever regard the aborigines as other than mere occupants, and incompetent occupants, of
the soil. Any title that could come from them was always disdained. . . . Only that
title that was esteemed which came from white men . . . .
The Indian was a child, and a dangerous child, of nature, to be both protected and
restrained. In his nomadic life he was to be left so long as civilization did not demand his region. When it did demand that region, he was to be allotted a more confined area with permanent subsistence. . . .
These arrangements were but the announcement of our benevolence, which, notwithstanding our frequent frailties, has been continuously displayed. Neither Rome
nor sagacious Britain ever dealt more liberally with their subject races than we
with these savage tribes, whom it was generally tempting and always easy to destroy, and whom we have so often permitted to squander vast areas of fertile land
before our eyes.
267

16 U.S.C. §§ 839–839h (2012).

2020]

THE BELLONI DECISION AND ITS LEGACY

385

treaty rights.268 That program, first promulgated in 1982 and now in its
sixth iteration,269 has helped to elevate the tribes and their expertise
into the forefront of salmon restoration. The Belloni decision’s influence
in paving the way for this program is no exaggeration.
Finally, the co-management plans that the Belloni decision
prompted—the most tangible results of the 1969 decision a half-century
later—required the prodding and oversight of federal judges like
Belloni, and no doubt still require judicial review to this day.270 These
plans were the first judicial call for the states and the tribes to use their
sovereign authorities to create co-management principles to govern an
extremely valuable but increasingly scarce natural resource that they
shared. Belloni’s insight was that in order to achieve the tribes’
proprietary promise of a “fair share” of the resource, the court—and the
state—had to recognize their sovereign role in management. Charles
Wilkinson’s claim that this recognition was a signal moment for tribal
sovereignty is no overstatement.271 The Belloni decision was indeed a
watershed in tribal sovereignty. The evolution and implementation of
the plans he ordered serve as examples for other natural resources in
need of co-management,272 and they almost certainly would not have
existed without the prodding and patience of a wise federal judge.
Judge Belloni well understood both the educative and mediative
roles that a federal court can play concerning longstanding and
controversial issues like state regulation of treaty fishing rights. His
268 Id. § 839b(h)(6)(B) (best available science); id. § 839b(h)(6)(D) (consistent with treaty
rights).
269 See 1982 Columbia River Basin Fish & Wildlife Program, NORTHWEST POWER AND
CONSERVATION COUNCIL, https://perma.cc/KD64-PQYY (last visited Apr. 18, 2020). The
importance of the tribal role in formulating the program was emphasized by the Ninth
Circuit in Northwest Res. Info. Ctr. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371,
1395 (9th Cir. 1994) (instructing what is now known as the Northwest Power and Conservation Council that it must adopt recommendations of the tribes in its program or explain
with specificity why not); see Michael C. Blumm, Michael A. Schoessler & R. Christopher
Beckwith, Beyond the Parity Promise: Struggling to Save Columbia Basin Salmon in the
mid-1990s, 27 ENVTL. L. 21, 44–49 (1997) (discussing the case); see also supra notes 229–
230.
270 See supra notes 232–243 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Mosman’s curious “administrative closure” of the case).
271 Charles Wilkinson, The Belloni Decision: A Foundation for the Northwest Fisheries
Cases, the National Tribal Sovereignty Movement, and an Understanding of the Rule of
Law, 50 ENVTL. L. 331, 332 (2020).
272 One of the advantages of the plans the parties agreed to under the guidance of Belloni and his successors was that the process was a repetitive one, often quarterly and
sometimes more often. Eventually, the parties agreed that the most expeditious means of
implementing the plans was to avoid judicial review by reaching negotiated agreements on
issues on which they disagreed. The repeated process disciplined the parties, encouraged
agreement on common goals and collaborative scientific inquires, as well as developing a
measure of trust among the participants that fostered a spirit of compromise. See Panel
Discussion: Coby Howell, Senior Trial Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, John Ogan, Tribal
Attorney, Warm Springs Tribe, and Michael Grossman, Senior Counsel, State of Washington, U.S. v. Oregon: 50th Anniversary Symposium, held by Lewis & Clark Law School
(Oct. 18, 2019).
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example is one that has, so far, endured. We hope that its educative and
mediative examples remain a model for the next half-century and
beyond.

